A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques by Gohara, Miriam S.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 33 | Number 3 Article 3
2006
A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for
Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive
Interrogation Techniques
Miriam S. Gohara
Criminal Justice Project, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33
Fordham Urb. L.J. 791 (2006).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol33/iss3/3
A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the
Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques
Cover Page Footnote
This article is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Welsh White who painstakingly reviewed several drafts and
was immeasurably generous with his expertise and feedback. I also owe and enormous debt of gratitude to
Tanya Coke for her review and edits and to Dan Korobkin for substantial research assistance. Many thanks
also to Maria Pulzetti and Jessica Zertuche for additional research assistance.
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol33/iss3/3
GOHARA_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011 10:18 PM 
 
101 
 
A LIE FOR A LIE: FALSE CONFESSIONS AND 
THE CASE FOR RECONSIDERING THE 
LEGALITY OF DECEPTIVE INTERROGATION 
TECHNIQUES 
Miriam S. Gohara*
“History amply shows that confessions have often been extorted to save 
law enforcement officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and 
independent evidence.”
 
1
“The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence . . .  to 
obtain a tainted conviction [is] implicit in any concept of ordered 
liberty.”
 
2
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The December 2002 exoneration of five young men who were convicted 
of the infamous 1989 attack on a jogger in Central Park highlighted the 
ease with which standard interrogation techniques can produce false 
confessions that lead to wrongful convictions. 3
When the jogger was attacked in 1989, the public was convinced that the 
five Harlem youths, who repeatedly incriminated themselves and each 
other, were guilty beyond doubt.  Meanwhile, the actual attacker committed 
 
 
 *  Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Project, NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc.; B.A., Columbia 1994; J.D., Harvard 1997.  This article is dedicated 
to the memory of Prof. Welsh White who painstakingly reviewed several drafts and was 
immeasurably generous with his expertise and feedback.  I also owe an enormous debt of 
gratitude to Tanya Coke for her review and edits and to Dan Korobkin for substantial 
research assistance.  Many thanks also to Maria Pulzetti and Jessica Zertuche for additional 
research assistance. 
 1. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963). 
 2. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 
 3. See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Convictions and Charges Voided in ’89 Central Park 
Jogger Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A1.  For a more detailed discussion of the 
jogger case, see Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in 
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 894-900 (2004); N. Jeremi Duru, The Central 
Park Five, The Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1315, 1346-60 (2004). 
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three more rapes and a rape and murder before he was caught.4
A significant part of the answer may be attributable to the court-
approved interrogation techniques that police have been using for decades 
in station houses across the country. Principal among these is the routine 
deception of suspects about a range of issues which influence a suspect’s 
willingness to make an incriminating statement.  In the Central Park jogger 
case, family members of the five exonerated youths have alleged that the 
police tricked the boys into believing that they were simply giving 
statements as witnesses, not as suspects, and that once they provided taped 
interviews, they would be allowed to go home.
  In 2002, 
when the case unraveled after the actual perpetrator confessed to attacking 
the victim by himself, the public scratched its collective head while trying 
to understand why not only one, but several, of the boys had apparently 
falsely confessed to their involvement in the brutal attack on the jogger. 
5  In addition, the 
interrogation tactic of leading each boy to believe that others had already 
confessed and implicated the others was particularly effective.6  For 
example, Kharey Wise, one of the exonerated five youths, said he initially 
told police he knew nothing about the jogger.  But when police told him 
that his friends had said that he was at the scene, “he started making up 
facts ‘just to give them what they wanted to hear.’”7  Wise said that the 
police told him he would be able to go home after giving his statement, but 
instead they took him to jail.  In his words, “‘I fell for it.’”8  Other 
deceptive tactics were also employed.  One detective even admitted to 
falsely telling one of the suspects that his fingerprints would be found on 
the jogger’s shorts.9
The case of Martin Tankleff presents another high profile example of the 
pitfalls of police trickery on youthful and other vulnerable suspects.  
Tankleff was seventeen years old when his parents were discovered 
stabbed to death in their Long Island home.
 
10
 
 4. See Jim Dwyer, Amid Focus on Youths in Jogger Case, a Rapist’s Attacks 
Continued, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at B1. 
  Tankleff, who had been 
asleep in the house at the time his parents were killed, immediately became 
 5. See House of Cards: Experts Say Interrogation Techniques Can Encourage False 
Confessions (ABC News broadcast Sept. 26, 2002). 
 6. See id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 897 & n.20 (citing THOMAS MCKENNA, 
MANHATTAN NORTH HOMICIDE 11 (1991) (authored by Detective Thomas McKenna, who 
investigated the Jogger case)). 
 10. Bruce Lambert, Long Jailed In Killings, Son Tells of Ordeal; Fighting Conviction in 
Parents’ Murder with Focus on New Evidence,  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at A43 
[hereinafter Lambert, Long Jailed in Killings, Son Tells of Ordeal]. 
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the prime suspect.11  During the interrogation, the lead detective, by his 
own admission, told Tankleff untruthfully that his father had awakened at 
the hospital and identified him as the attacker.12  Tankleff told the police 
that his father had never lied to him and that if he identified him as the 
attacker, maybe he had “blacked out” and in fact killed his parents.13  The 
police agreed with Tankleff that he had probably committed the crime but 
blocked the memory.  Tankleff then provided a possible narrative of the 
crime but was unable to provide any details of the crime apart from 
information detectives had presented during his interrogation.14  The 
detective penned a confession based on this narrative which Tankleff 
refused to sign and immediately disavowed.15  The statement contained 
details of the crime which were irreconcilable with the physical evidence.16  
Nevertheless, the statement was admitted at Tankleff’s trial and became the 
centerpiece of the case against him.  Though he remains incarcerated for 
the crime, post-conviction investigation has revealed strong evidence 
pointing to his father’s business partner, Jerry Steuerman, as the likely 
culprit.17  The police never investigated Steuerman, despite the fact that he 
had a motive to murder the victims—he owed them hundreds of thousands 
of dollars and had been arguing with them about this shortly before they 
died—and despite the fact that he staged his own suicide shortly after the 
Tankleff murders.18
 
 11. Id. at A48. 
  Police explained their failure to investigate Steuerman 
 12. Id.  The detective also misrepresented a number of other facts during Tankleff’s 
interrogation.  He told Tankleff that his hair was found in his mother’s hands and that a test 
proved that he had used his shower after his parents’ murder, and speculated that he had 
done so in order to wash off their blood.  See Bruce Lambert, Awaiting Next Word in 17-
Year-Old Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006, at B1. 
 13. See John Springer, New Evidence Gives Hope to Long Island Man Convicted of 
Killing Parents (Court T.V. broadcast July 20, 2004). 
 14. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: 
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological 
Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 458 (1998) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, 
The Consequences of False Confessions]; see also Lambert, Long Jailed In Killings, Son 
Tells of Ordeal supra note 10, at A48. 
 15. Lambert, Long Jailed In Killings, Son Tells of Ordeal, supra note 10, at A48. 
 16. For example, even though the bodies showed signs of a struggle, no blood or tissue 
were found under Tankleff’s fingernails and his own body exhibited no bruises or scratches.  
The murder weapons identified in the statement, a knife and a barbell, were found in the 
home without a trace of blood.  Id.; see also Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False 
Confessions, supra note 14, at 458. 
 17. Lambert, Long Jailed in Killings, Son Tells of Ordeal, supra note 10, at 48; Bruce 
Lambert, Youth Says Father Admitted to ‘88 Long Island Murders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2005, at B6 (reporting that Joseph Creedon, an alleged accomplice of Steuerman’s, 
implicated himself and Steuerman in the Tankleff  murder). 
 18. Lambert, Long Jailed in Killings, Son Tells of Ordeal, supra note 10, at 48. 
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by saying that they “were confident they had solved the case with [Martin] 
Tankleff’s arrest.”19  Several witnesses have since come forward and 
admitted that associates of Mr. Steuerman recruited them to attack the 
Tankleffs.20  Martin Tankleff’s motion for a new trial was denied by the 
trial court in Suffolk County, New York.21
Courts have repeatedly held that police are free to mislead suspects 
about everything from the existence of physical evidence against them, to 
the results of polygraphs, to the statements of alleged cohorts incriminating 
them in the crime.  The bedrock cases sanctioning police deception, 
however, pre-date the advent of DNA testing and the many exonerations 
that followed from DNA test results.
 
22
This article reviews the law on deceptive interrogation practices, 
discusses empirical evidence of the role police deception plays in eliciting 
false confessions and argues that the law should circumscribe interrogation 
techniques that rely on misrepresentation to induce suspects into 
incriminating themselves.
  As the Central Park Jogger and 
Tankleff cases demonstrate, interrogation practices in which police 
misrepresent evidence against suspects can and do lead to false confessions 
and wrongful convictions.  Examination of actual wrongful convictions and 
additional empirical data demonstrating the correlation between deceptive 
interrogation practices and false confessions provide a basis for 
reconsidering the line of cases that allow police to use trickery to obtain 
confessions.  Such reconsideration is particularly critical because at the 
time those cases were decided, it was assumed that deceptive interrogations 
would not lead to false confessions. 
23  This article also asserts that there are good 
policy reasons, in addition to the increasing exposure of wrongful 
convictions, which should encourage courts and legislators to proscribe the 
use of deception by law enforcement in a criminal justice system expressly 
designed to elicit the truth about a crime.24
 
 19. Id. 
  
 20. See id.; Springer, supra note 13. 
 21. Bruce Lambert, Verdict Upheld in 1998 Killings of L.I. Couple, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
18, 2006, at B1.    
 22. For a more detailed description of the advent of wrongful conviction research, and 
the impact of DNA on the study of false confessions specifically, see Drizin & Leo, supra 
note 3; see also Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 527 (2005) (“The rate of exonerations has 
increased sharply over the fifteen year period of this study, from an average of twelve a year 
[through the early 1990s] to an average of forty-two a year since 2000.”). 
 23. See also Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure To Restrain Pernicious Interrogation 
Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1246-47 (2001) [hereinafter White, Miranda’s Failure] 
(arguing police deception may induce false confessions). 
 24. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); 
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Numerous articles have described the phenomenon of false confessions 
and some have examined the factors which cause people to implicate 
themselves in crimes they did not commit.25  Little has been written to date, 
however, about the specific impact on the reliability of confessions of 
standard interrogation techniques including trickery and deception of 
suspects.  Moreover, despite increasing numbers of wrongful convictions 
that have resulted from demonstrably false confessions, criminal justice 
reforms aimed at protecting the innocent have missed the opportunity to 
reconsider laws which allow police to trick suspects about a wide variety of 
subjects, including the strength and availability of incriminating evidence, 
in order to induce a confession.26
Part II reviews the case law affirming the use of deceptive law 
enforcement interrogations.  In pre-Miranda cases, the Supreme Court 
recognized that in some circumstances, trickery during interrogations was 
coercive and rendered confessions inadmissible.
  This article provides data and policy 
arguments in favor of adopting reforms of standard interrogation tactics in 
which police mislead suspects about evidence and other factors which 
suspects weigh heavily before deciding whether to incriminate themselves.  
The article also proposes novel, specific reforms limiting the use of 
standard interrogation techniques and recommends challenges to 
confessions begotten from interrogations employing trickery. 
27  In post-Miranda cases, 
however, the Court has applied a “totality of the circumstances” test and 
indicated that, so long as the police comply with Miranda, statements 
obtained through deceptive interrogation practices will almost invariably be 
admissible.28
 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. 
of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 384 (2004) (noting that executive privilege claims that shield 
evidence from disclosure to the grand jury or at trial may not be expansively construed 
because “they are in derogation of the search for truth”) (internal citation omitted). 
  So as the law stands today, trickery which does not deprive a 
suspect of his Miranda rights, does not by itself invalidate a confession.  
Part III describes and then critiques deceptive police techniques 
recommended in leading law enforcement training manuals.  After 
describing these techniques, Part III examines empirical data bearing on 
whether these techniques are likely to produce reliable statements. Part IV 
argues that in light of the growing body of empirical evidence 
demonstrating that law enforcement trickery plays a significant role in false 
confessions, defense lawyers should challenge confessions made after 
interrogations involving police trickery, courts should circumscribe 
 25. See infra section III.B. 
 26. See infra section IV.A 
27 See infra notes 31-41. 
28 See infra notes 42-73. 
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interrogation techniques which employ lies to induce a suspect to confess, 
and legislatures should regulate or proscribe those deceptive interrogation 
techniques—such as false evidence ploys—which have proven most likely 
to elicit false confessions.29
II. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND LOWER COURT 
CASES CONSIDERING THE LEGALITY OF DECEPTIVE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 
 
Prior to its 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona,30 the Supreme Court, 
applying a due process voluntariness test, recognized, in several cases, that 
the police use of deceptive interrogation tactics played a significant role in 
producing involuntary confessions.31  In Leyra v. Denno,32 Leyra asked the 
police to allow him to see a physician because he was suffering from sinus 
problems.33
 
 29. False evidence ploys and other overt forms of deception are certainly not the only 
type of deceptive interrogation practices.  As psychologist Saul Kassin has written, the 
“minimization” technique prescribed by leading interrogation manuals, allows police to 
refrain from explicitly promising a suspect lenience in exchange for a confession—a 
practice which would render the confession inadmissible in court—but still allows the 
interrogator to suggest implicitly that the confession will ameliorate the consequences of the 
suspect’s having incriminated himself.  See Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of 
Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 222 
(2005) [hereinafter Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?] (“[I]t is now clear 
that . . . [minimization] circumvents the exclusion of promise-elicited leniency ‘under the 
radar.’”); see also infra notes 
  The police brought in a psychiatrist who posed as a general 
physician.  The Supreme Court held that the “subtle and suggestive” 
questioning by the psychiatrist amounted to a continued interrogation of the 
92-111 and accompanying text (discussing the minimization 
technique in more detail). 
 30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 31. Under the “due process voluntariness test,” courts evaluated the admissibility of a 
suspect’s statement by determining under the totality of the circumstances whether the 
statement was voluntary, i.e., “the product of a rational intellect and a free will.”  Blackburn 
v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960).  See White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 23, at 
1215-17 (discussing the “minimal safeguards” against pernicious interrogation tactics that 
Miranda’s core protections have actually afforded suspects); see also Mark A. Godsey, 
Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying 
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465 (2005) (tracing the history of confession 
law before and after Miranda and advocating for a departure from Miranda’s focus on 
subjective “voluntariness” under the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause and instead 
adopting an “objective penalties test” under the self-incrimination clause, which would 
render inadmissible confessions compelled by the use of certain defined “objective 
penalties”); id. at 540 (“This test would hold any confession inadmissible when it has been 
obtained by imposing an objective penalty [defined within the article based on a review of 
relevant law] on the suspect under interrogation to provoke speech or punish silence.”). 
 32. 347 U.S. 556 (1954). 
 33. Id. at 559. 
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suspect without his knowledge.34  This deception and other circumstances 
of the interrogation rendered Leyra’s confession involuntary.35  Similarly, 
in Spano v. New York,36 the Court considered a case in which the suspect 
regarded one of the interrogating officers to be a friend.  The Court held 
that the officer’s false statements, which suggested that the suspect’s 
actions might cost the officer his job, were a key factor in rendering the 
confession involuntary.37
Even where the defendant fell short of establishing that the police 
actually lied to him, in the pre-Miranda era, the Court was willing to 
consider the coercive effect of deceptive interrogation techniques.  For 
example, in Lynumn v. Illinois,
 
38 the Court held that police threats to 
remove a suspect’s children and the government aid she received to support 
them, overbore her will and coerced her confession, because she was not 
familiar enough with the legal system to know whether the police actually 
had the authority to carry out their threats.39
In an oft-quoted phrase from Miranda, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the potentially coercive effect of obtaining confessions 
through police trickery and intimidation: “As a practical matter, the 
compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be 
greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often 
impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.”
   
40  The Court 
indicated that the deceptive tactics recommended by standard interrogation 
manuals fostered the coercive environment of police interrogation.41
 
34 Id.at 561. 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
 37. Id. at 323. 
 38. 372 U.S. 528 (1963). 
 39. Id. at 534; see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964) (holding that the 
suspect’s right to counsel had been violated where the interrogating officers obtained the 
suspect’s incriminating statement by tricking him into believing that his alleged accomplice 
had incriminated him, and noting that counsel is particularly critical when “the police carry 
out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements”). 
 40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).  Shortly after Miranda was decided, 
critics cited concerns that the procedures it requires actually obscure, rather than elucidate, 
the truth in criminal trials.  Cf. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 707-708 (1993) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting in part); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 542 (White, J., dissenting) 
(objecting that the Court’s holding in Miranda “establish[ed] a new . . .  barrier to the 
ascertainment of truth by the judicial process”); see also Godsey, supra, note 31, at 508-09 
(describing contemporaneous criticisms of Miranda). 
 41. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
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A. Trickery in the Post-Miranda era 
Following Miranda, which established that a suspect’s custodial 
statements cannot be used against him unless police apprise the suspect of 
his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the Supreme Court precedent 
concerning interrogation trickery changed direction almost immediately. 
Three years after Miranda, in Frazier v. Cupp,42 the Court undermined the 
suggestion that confessions obtained through trickery may be coercive.  
Frazier held that the voluntariness of a confession induced by police 
trickery must be evaluated under a “totality of the circumstances” test.43  In 
Frazier, police used two forms of trickery to extract a statement from the 
suspect.  First, they told Frazier that another man whom Frazier and the 
victim had been seen with on the night of the crime had confessed to 
involvement in the crime.44  The investigating detective also suggested, 
sympathetically, that Frazier had started a fight with the victim because the 
victim made homosexual advances toward him.45  The Court held that 
Frazier’s confession was voluntary, and cited only the officers’ false 
statements regarding the co-defendant’s confession as trickery.46  It did not 
consider the feigned sympathy about the homosexual advance as such.47  
Frazier established that police deception itself would not be enough, on its 
own, to render a confession involuntary.  Rather, according to Frazier, 
police deception is one factor among many that a court should consider in 
evaluating the voluntariness of a suspect’s incriminating statements.48
The evolution to a “totality of the circumstances” test suggests that once 
 
 
 42. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). 
 43. Id. at 739. 
 44. Id. at 737. 
 45. Id. at 738. 
 46. Id. at 739. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  A couple of additional Supreme Court cases have addressed police trickery 
directly.  In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34 (1986), the Court held that police 
deception of an attorney, whom a suspect’s family had contacted to represent him, did not 
render the suspect’s three instances of waiver of his Miranda rights and subsequent 
confession involuntary.  The attorney had attempted to contact the suspect by calling the 
police station.  Id. at 417.  Police told the attorney that the suspect would be questioned the 
following day, and never notified the suspect that the attorney had tried to contact him.  Id.  
The suspect then waived his rights and gave the incriminating statements.  Id. 
  In a 1984 decision, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Court held that a 
statement police obtained without Mirandizing a suspect, and the gun to which the statement 
led the authorities, were admissible pursuant to the “public safety” exception to Miranda.  
Id. at 655-56.  In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, asserted 
that in order to avert a potential public emergency, police may “of course” resort to coercion 
and trickery to reveal life-saving information, but that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the 
admissibility of such statements at trial. Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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the Court established the Miranda safeguards, it was willing to allow police 
leeway to use interrogation tactics which had previously been considered 
coercive.49  This result is evinced by the scores of federal decisions 
recognizing exceptions to Miranda’s admonition that deceptive 
interrogation tactics may compromise a confession’s voluntariness, 
especially in cases where Miranda warnings have been administered.50
In 2004, the Court established that when interrogation tactics deprive a 
suspect of an adequate understanding of her Miranda rights, they render the 
resulting incriminating statements involuntary.  Missouri v. Seibert
  
51 
involved the interrogation of Patrice Seibert for an arson which resulted in 
the death of a teenager.52  The officer who interrogated her had been 
instructed to refrain from giving Seibert Miranda warnings.53  At the police 
station, the officer left Seibert alone in the interrogation room for twenty 
minutes and then interrogated her for thirty to forty minutes, all without 
Mirandizing her.54  After Seibert admitted that she intended for the 
teenager to die in the fire, the officer gave her a twenty-minute coffee and 
cigarette break.55  The officer returned, turned on a tape recorder and gave 
Seibert the Miranda warning.56  She signed a waiver of rights, and the 
officer resumed the interrogation, starting by confronting Seibert with her 
pre-Miranda admissions.57  Seibert, who was later charged with first-
degree murder, sought to exclude both her pre-warning and post-warning 
statements.58
 
 49. See Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739. 
  At the suppression hearing, the officer who interrogated 
Seibert testified that he made a “conscious decision” not to Mirandize her 
at the outset.  He acknowledged that he acted pursuant to an interrogation 
 50. See White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 23, at 1220 
Two factors have contributed to the infrequency with which lower courts find due 
process violations in post-[Miranda] waiver confession cases.  First, lower courts 
conflate the test for determining a valid Miranda waiver with the test for 
determining a voluntary confession because the tests are so similar. Both tests 
require the court to assess the ‘totality of [the] circumstances’ to determine 
whether the suspect’s action was voluntary. . . Second, the Supreme Court’s 
limited application of the voluntariness test during the post-Miranda era has 
probably increased lower courts’ natural inclination to disfavor involuntary 
confession claims.   
Id. 
 51. 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 52. Id. at 604-05. 
 53. Id. at 604. 
 54. Id. at 604-05. 
 55. Id. at 605. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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technique whereby officers are instructed to withhold the warnings, 
question the suspects, then give the warnings, repeat the questions, and use 
the suspects’ pre-warning statements against them.59  He further 
acknowledged that Seibert’s post-Miranda statement was repetitive of her 
pre-warning statements.60  She was convicted of second-degree murder.61  
On direct appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed Seibert’s 
conviction on the grounds that her post-Miranda statements were the 
product of her “invalid first statement” and should have been suppressed at 
trial.62  The United States Supreme Court affirmed and held that the 
Miranda warnings administered to Seibert were delivered “mid-
interrogation” and were therefore ineffective in protecting her Fifth 
Amendment rights.63  In reaching this conclusion, the Court gave great 
weight to the fact that the officer’s questioning of Seibert was “systematic, 
exhaustive, and managed with psychological skill.”64  This coupled with 
the facts that: the first and second interrogations were conducted by the 
same officer; both interrogations took place in the same station house; a 
mere fifteen to twenty minutes lapsed between the two interrogations; and 
the officer repeatedly made reference to the first interrogation during the 
second, rendered it “reasonable to regard the two sessions as part of a 
continuum,” and thereby nullified the effect of the Miranda warning 
delivered between Seibert’s two statements.65
Although Seibert lays groundwork for some limits on deliberately 
deceptive interrogation tactics,
 
66
 
 59. Id. at 609-10.  The court noted: 
 the case fell short of establishing clearly 
An officer of [the Rolla, Missouri] police department testified [at Seibert’s 
suppression hearing] that the strategy of withholding Miranda warnings until after 
interrogating and drawing out a confession was promoted not only by his own 
department, but by a national police training organization and other departments 
in which he had worked . . . Consistently with the officer’s testimony, the Police 
Law Institute, for example, instructs that ‘officers may conduct a two-stage 
interrogation . . . At any point during the pre-Miranda interrogation, usually after 
arrestees have confessed, officers may then read the Miranda warnings and ask 
for a waiver.  If the arrestees waive their Miranda rights, officers will be able to 
repeat any subsequent incriminating statements later in court.’ 
Id. (quoting POLICE LAW INST., IL. POLICE LAW MANUAL 83 (Jan. 2001-Dec. 2003) 
(emphasis in original) ). 
 60. Id. at 606. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 701 (2002)). 
 63. Id. at 617. 
 64. See id. at 616. 
 65. See id. at 616-17. 
 66. Note that Seibert reinforces the post-Miranda trend that an interrogation practice 
which undermines Miranda will likely render a confession involuntary, but that once 
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discernible standards for assessing when trickery renders a confession 
involuntary.  Moreover, Seibert only directly applies to cases involving the 
deliberate withholding of Miranda warnings.  It makes no explicit 
statement about the use of other sorts of deception, in some instances 
blatant untruths, used to trick suspects into confessing in cases where they 
have been Mirandized legitimately.  In other words, the Court refrained 
from seizing the occasion to affirm the principles established in its Leyra, 
Spano, and the other pre-Miranda cases which recognized that under some 
circumstances deliberately lying to a suspect during interrogation per se 
nullified statements obtained therefrom.67
The federal courts of appeals have applied and expanded on the Supreme 
Court’s tolerance of deceptive police practices to induce confessions.  
Several circuit court decisions have held confessions to be voluntary where 
police have misrepresented the existence of physical evidence linking the 
suspect to the crime;
 
68
 
Miranda is invoked, police are granted wide berth in employing deceptive interrogation 
techniques.  In fact, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment on a narrower ground: that 
there must be a finding that the police intentionally employed a tactic designed to undermine 
Miranda warnings before a statement should be considered involuntary.  Id. at 621-22 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 where they have fabricated statements of 
 67. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text. 
 68. See United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 408 (1st Cir. 1998) 
[T]rickery is not automatically coercion. Indeed, the police commonly engage in 
such ruses as suggesting to a suspect that a confederate has just confessed or that 
police have or will secure physical evidence against the suspect.  While the line 
between ruse and coercion is sometimes blurred, confessions procured by deceits 
have been held voluntary in a number of situations. 
Id.; Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that under the 
totality of the circumstances, use of phony evidence including picture of fingerprint 
misrepresented as being from crime scene, telling suspect he had been identified in photo 
array, and creating a staged scene where a police officer acting as the victim “identified” the 
suspect through glass in the police station did not render the confession involuntary, and 
noting that it was obtained by “means of legitimate law-enforcement methods that withstand 
constitutional scrutiny”); see also Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(finding confessions voluntary where police falsely informed the defendant that his 
fingerprints had been found at the victim’s home; “misrepresentations, without more, do not 
render an otherwise voluntary confession involuntary”); United States v. Welch, No. 93-
4043, 1994 U.S. App Lexis 26574, at *6 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 1994) (finding that an officer’s 
telling the defendant that “new DNA test[ing]” had shown that her daughter had not died of 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome and that strong circumstantial evidence linked the defendant 
to the girls’ deaths did not render her confession involuntary); Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 
894, 903-04 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that confession was voluntary despite police 
“‘chicanery’” of falsely telling the defendant that his fingerprints matched prints taken off 
blood in the victims’ apartment); Sotelo v. Ind. State Prison, 850 F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (finding confession voluntary where police, inter alia, falsely told the suspect 
that the results of a polygraph indicated that he was lying about his innocence, which along 
with other tactics induced his confession). 
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accomplices implicating the suspect being questioned;69 where they have 
made false promises of leniency;70 where they have misrepresented the 
intention to prosecute or the seriousness of the charges against the 
suspect;71
 
 69. See United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1989) (deciding 
that a confession was voluntary although detectives falsely informed the suspect that her 
alleged accomplice had been released after making statements against her and these false 
statements made the government’s evidence look much stronger than it actually was); 
United States v. Petary, 857 F.2d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Frazier v. Cupp and 
holding that under the totality of the circumstances, interrogating a suspect for six to seven 
hours who had not slept for twenty-four hours, had consumed beer but no food, and telling 
him that his alleged accomplice was talking to agents was not coercive); United States v. 
Castaneda-Castaneda, 729 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding the confessions of 
husband and wife co-defendants voluntary after police falsely told the husband the wife had 
confessed, he confessed, and then they returned to the wife with the husband’s statements 
and she also confessed); see also Schmidt v. Hewitt, 573 F.2d 794, 801 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(remanding to the trial court for a hearing on voluntariness after officers falsely told the 
suspect his accomplices had confessed and interrogated him for five days without allowing 
him to see his mother); cf. Nelson v. Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928, 940-41 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(remanding for further fact finding where, after invoking his Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent, the suspect was confronted with his alleged accomplice, the two had a 
conversation in which the accomplice said he admitted to the crime, and the suspect made 
inculpatory remarks; the court noted that if the police had falsely told the suspect that the 
accomplice had confessed before placing them in the room together, such tactic would be 
prohibited as a ploy likely to induce a confession, pursuant to Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 
U.S. 291, 299 (1980), but that if the accomplice was simply placed in the room without 
more, the confession would not meet the test of being reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response). 
 where police have falsely promised the suspect psychiatric help 
 70. See United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 91 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that a 
confession was voluntary when given in response to a promise of immunity from an FBI 
agent without authority to grant immunity) (“The mere fact that an unfulfilled promise was 
made in exchange for a person’s statement does not constitute coercion . . . .  Of course 
trickery can sink to the level of coercion, but this is a relatively rare phenomenon.”); United 
States v. Rojas-Martinez, 968 F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding implicit promises to let 
suspects return to Mexico insufficient to render confessions involuntary); United States v. 
Harris, 914 F.2d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is well settled that police may use small 
deceptions while interrogating witnesses . . . [and] police are free to solicit confessions by 
offering to reduce the charges against the defendant.”); cf. United States v. Powe, 591 F.2d 
833, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[I]t is firmly established that self-incriminating statements 
induced by promises or offers of leniency shall be regarded as involuntary and shall not be 
admitted into evidence for any purpose.”). 
 71. See United States v. Haynes, No. 00-4675, 2001 WL 1459702 at *8 (4th Cir. Nov. 
19, 2001) (finding a confession voluntary where police staged a room to give the impression 
that a “massive investigation” of the defendant for a triple homicide was ongoing, though 
the defendant had been arrested on charges of cocaine distribution); see also Byram, 145 
F.3d at 408 (holding that the suspect’s statements were voluntary where police gave him 
false assurances that he would not be prosecuted); United States v. Matthews, 942 F.2d 779, 
782 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding the suspect’s statements voluntary where he was led to believe 
that if he cooperated, no charges would be brought against him); Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 
598, 609-10 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding the confession voluntary although police lied about the 
victim’s status, though she was dead, the officer represented at the beginning of the 
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in exchange for a statement;72 and where they have misled the suspect 
about the strength of the evidence against him.73
B. Impermissible Trickery 
 
A few courts have circumscribed deceptive interrogation practices that 
they have considered extreme in some way.74  Some have also suggested 
that any interrogation practices likely to result in false confessions are 
impermissible.75  For example, at least two state courts have made a 
distinction between verbal misrepresentations and fabricated tangible 
evidence and have held that the boundaries of deceptive interrogation 
techniques must be drawn at the latter.  In State v. Cayward,76
In addition to our spontaneous distaste for the conduct we have reviewed 
in this matter, we have practical concerns regarding use of false reports 
beyond the inducement of a confession.  Unlike oral misrepresentations, 
manufactured documents have the potential of indefinite life and the 
 a Florida 
appeals court held that the fabrication of scientific reports implicating a 
suspect and the presentation thereof to the suspect during his interrogation 
rendered his confession invalid.  The court cited several policy 
justifications for its holding: 
 
interview that she was alive and told the suspect “you are not a criminal”); cf. Hart v. 
Attorney Gen. of Fl., 323 F.3d 884, 894-95 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the suspect’s 
confession was involuntary given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation where a police officer whom the suspect “trusted” told him that the “cons” of 
having an attorney present were that the attorney would tell him not to answer the officer’s 
questions; on the grounds that such misleading information rendered the suspect’s waiver of 
his Miranda rights involuntary). 
 72. See Green, 850 F.2d at 903 (holding that confession was uncoerced where 
detectives, inter alia, promised to obtain psychiatric help for suspect); Miller, 796 F.2d at 
610 (same); Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting petitioner’s 
argument that his confession was involuntary because police officer said that as far as he 
knew petitioner/suspect would receive medical help for his mental condition); cf. United 
States v. Raymer, 876 F.2d 383, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Police exploitation of the mental 
condition of a suspect, using ‘subtle forms of psychological persuasion,’ could render a 
confession involuntary,” but did not in the instant case) (internal citation omitted). 
 73. See, e.g., Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1050-51 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding the 
defendant’s first confession, which followed kicking, beating, punching, and pulling hair by 
police involuntary, but finding second confession, which took place in another police station 
under questioning by different officers six hours later, voluntary, even though the second 
group of officers falsely represented that a witness had seen the suspect at the crime scene). 
 74. See State v. Thacker, No. W2002-01119-CCA-R3-DD, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. 
LEXIS 1133, at *83 (Tenn Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2003) (quoting State v. Stephenson, 878 
S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994)); cf. Lara v. State, 25 P.3d 507, 510 (Wyo. 2001). 
 75. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baity, 237 A.2d 172, 177 (Pa. 1968) (“[A] trick which 
has no tendency to produce a false confession is a permissible weapon in the interrogator’s 
arsenal.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Spardute, 122 A.161, 164 (Pa. 1923)). 
 76. 552 So. 2d 971, 974-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
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facial appearance of authenticity.  A report falsified for interrogation 
purposes might well be retained and filed in police paperwork.  Such 
reports have the potential of finding their way into the courtroom.77
The Superior Court of New Jersey cited Cayward extensively in State v. 
Patton.
 
78  In Patton, the defendant challenged his confession in part on the 
grounds that it was induced after police fabricated an audiotape of an 
eyewitness who claimed to have seen the defendant perpetrate the crime.79  
The New Jersey trial court admitted the tape, which also contained a 
“roadmap” of the prosecution’s theory of the crime and hearsay evidence of 
prior bad acts by the defendant.  The appeals court ordered a new trial and 
held that the fabricated evidence “set in motion a confluence of events that 
tainted not only the interrogation process but the trial itself.”80  The court 
went on to note that the “totality of the circumstances” test is “not without 
limits” and held Patton’s confession per se involuntary as a result of the 
fabricated evidence.81  The court even went as far as equating the use of 
fabricated evidence with physical coercion during interrogation.82
Few federal courts have circumscribed the use of specific deceptive 
interrogation techniques, and only in rare cases have federal courts deemed 
deceptive interrogation practices coercive.  The federal courts generally 
apply a “totality of the circumstances” test, which is discussed in more 
detail, infra, in determining whether a confession is voluntary.
 
83
Deception, false assurances, and misrepresentations of the availability of 
independent incriminating evidence by themselves are generally  
insufficient to establish involuntariness under the federal courts’ 
application of the “totality” test.
  In 
applying the “totality” test, courts have considered all the circumstances 
surrounding a confession and have stopped short of issuing per se bars on 
particular deceptive tactics. 
84
 
 77. See also id. (listing concerns that opening the door for fabricated evidence may lead 
to the fabrication of warrants and other court documents and that sanctioning such 
fabrication by law enforcement would damage the rapport police have established with the 
general public). 
  Rather, federal courts’ central inquiry 
 78. 826 A.2d 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
 79. Id. at 789. 
 80. Id. at 800. 
 81. Id. at 802. 
 82. Id. at 805. 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1057 (2005). 
 84. See, e.g., Bell, 367 F.3d at 461-62 (holding that interrogators’ false statements that 
the suspect would go to jail if he lied to them and that police had physical evidence 
connecting the suspect to a rape did not render his confession involuntary because in this 
case, the deception had not overcome the suspect’s will); Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1060 
GOHARA_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:18 PM 
2006] A LIE FOR A LIE 115 
into the impact of a particular interrogation tactic on voluntariness is 
whether the allegedly coercive tactic overcame the suspect’s free will and 
rational decision-making.85
Despite the general paucity of federal caselaw circumscribing deceptive 
interrogation techniques, there are a few noteworthy federal decisions 
sanctioning the use of particular tactics.  The Seventh Circuit, for example, 
held, in the context of a Fourth Amendment consent-to-search claim, that 
“[a]lthough the law permits the police to pressure and cajole, conceal 
material facts, and actively mislead, it draws the line at outright fraud, as 
where police extract a confession in exchange for a false promise to set the 
defendant free.”
 
86  In so holding, the court drew explicit parallels between 
law enforcement deception in executing a search and in extracting a 
confession.87  The Ninth Circuit held that when detectives coerced a 
suspect into confessing by falsely telling him that his statement could not 
be used against him, the resultant statement was involuntary.88
Interrogations employing false or fabricated evidence where 
interrogators have misled suspects to believe that police possessed 
inculpatory evidence, including physical evidence or accomplices’ 
confessions have generally been held to be voluntary.
 
89
 
(internal citations omitted) (“Trickery, deceit, even impersonation do not render a 
confession inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial situations and usually in custodial ones as 
well, unless government agents make threats or promises.”); Monroe v. Coplan, No. Civ. 
02-069B,  2002 WL 31689343 at *5 (D.N.H. Nov. 22, 2002). (“Misrepresentation to a 
defendant of the strength of the government’s case is not per se coercive, although it is a 
factor to be considered in the ‘totality of the circumstances’ surrounding a confession.”). 
  At least one 
 85. See Bell, 372 F.3d at 462; United States v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 
2003)”; Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining that a 
confession was voluntary in light of the “surrounding circumstances and the combined 
effect of the entire course of the officer’s conduct upon the defendant” and holding that 
“misrepresentations made by law enforcement . . . while reprehensible, does [sic] not 
necessarily constitute coercive conduct”); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 
(1986). 
 86. Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted) 
(holding that the defendant’s mother’s consent to enter and search her home to arrest her 
son, after police misrepresentation that they had a warrant for his arrest, was obtained 
fraudulently, and that the search was therefore a Fourth Amendment violation); cf. United 
States v. Rucker, 348 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (applying the “totality” test to 
determine the voluntariness of a suspect’s consent to search, and finding that law 
enforcement deceit about prior entry into the suspect’s apartment did not overcome 
voluntariness in the absence of threats or promises). 
 87. Hadley, 368 F.3d at 749. 
 88. Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1027 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he slippery and illegal 
tactics of the detectives overcame Henry’s will and . . . he continued his confession only as a 
result of their deception.”). 
 89. See United States v. Lux, 905 F.2d 1379, 1382 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding as 
voluntary a confession made after police falsely told the suspect that her co-defendant had 
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federal court, however, has held that a confession obtained after police 
presented fabricated evidence, like that employed in Cayward, was 
involuntary.90
Cayward and its progeny represent an admirable effort by courts to set 
some limits on the use of deliberate deception to induce suspects to 
confess.
 
91
 
implicated her in the murder); Coplan, 2002 WL 31689343 at *7 (concluding that a 
confession was voluntary when it was obtained by an undercover officer posing as a witness 
to the crime who blackmailed the suspect by promising not to report him to authorities in 
exchange for $2,000 payment from the suspect); Dallio v. Spitzer, 170 F. Supp. 2d 327, 340 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) ), aff’d, 343 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2003) (denying habeas relief and finding 
that the confession was voluntary because the officer did not lie to the suspect, but merely 
asked what would happen if he were to tell the suspect that his fingerprints were found in 
blood at the murder scene); U.S. ex rel. Brandon v. LaVallee, 391 F. Supp. 1150, 1152 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same). But see Quartararo v. Mantello, 715 F. Supp. 449, 460-61 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 888 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding involuntary the confession of a 
fifteen-year-old boy whom police had questioned for four hours without counsel or family 
members present and falsely reported that his alleged accomplice had confessed to the 
homicide and “buried” the suspect). 
  The policies underlying these holdings, and reasons that other 
 90. Robinson v. Smith, 451 F. Supp. 1278, 1291-92 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that the 
police told the suspect that his accomplice had accused him of shooting the victim, had 
presented the suspect with a typed, fabricated confession “signed” by the accomplice, and 
had misled the suspect that the only way he could avoid “having a rope put around his neck” 
was by acknowledging his role and clearing himself of the shooting, though the crime was a 
felony murder and charges would be brought against both accomplices regardless of who 
did the shooting). 
 91. Cf. State v. Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50, 60 n.13 (W.Va. 1994) (citing State v. Cayward, 
552 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), with approval and opining that if the police 
in the instant case had fabricated a false polygraph report, the defendant’s confession would 
have been inadmissible); State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 73 (Haw. 1993).  The court in 
Kelekolio drew a distinction between deliberate falsehoods that are “intrinsic” to the facts of 
the offense and falsehoods which are “extrinsic” to those facts and held that the intrinsic 
deception will be considered among the totality of the circumstances while the extrinsic 
deception, which is more likely to produce a false confession, will be per se inadmissible.  
Id.  According to the court, examples of intrinsic falsehoods include: misrepresentations 
regarding the existence of incriminating evidence, a claim that a murder victim is still alive, 
discovery of a non-existent witness; examples of extrinsic falsehoods include: assurances of 
divine salvation upon confession, promises of mental health treatment in exchange for a 
confession, promises of favorable treatment in exchange for a confession, 
misrepresentations of legal principles.  Id.  See also United States v. Swint, 15 F.3d 286, 290 
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the government overreached, rendering a confession 
involuntary, by misleading the defendant about the implications of his statements); Woods 
v. Clusen, 794 F.2d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that under the totality of the 
circumstances the police overreached when they falsely reported to a juvenile suspect that 
his fingerprints had been found on the victim’s wallet, showed him gruesome photos of the 
crime scene, forced him to wear jail garb, and subjected him to intimidating statements); 
Singletary v. Fischer, 365 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding defense 
counsel ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of a confession obtained after police 
tricked a mentally retarded defendant by promising him leniency and drug treatment if he 
would make incriminating statements implicating himself in his niece’s murder); United 
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courts should follow and extend them, are further discussed in Part IV.  The 
cases limiting the use of certain deceptive interrogation techniques may lay 
the foundation for some of the reforms proposed in Part IV.  In fact, the 
leading interrogation manual, described in the next section, cites Cayward 
and admonishes officers not to fabricate evidence.  Nevertheless, as the law 
currently stands, a defendant seeking to suppress his confession on the sole 
grounds that the police induced it by tricking him faces bleak prospects of 
succeeding in court. 
III. DECEPTIVE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AND THE ROLE THEY 
PLAY IN ELICITING FALSE CONFESSIONS 
A. Review of Interrogation Manuals Prescribing Tricking and 
Deceiving Suspects92
The interrogation method most widely publicized and probably most 
widely used is known as the Reid Technique, which was introduced in the 
interrogation manual Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (“Inabu 
Manual”)
 
93
 
States v. Knowles, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1137 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (holding that a “pattern of 
deceptions” amounted to coercion during interrogation); Quartararo, 715 F. Supp. at 460 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (invalidating a confession given after the interrogating officer untruthfully 
told the defendant, that a  co-defendant had confessed and offered the defendant leniency to 
confess as well); Robinson v. Smith, 451 F. Supp. 1278, 1292 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Pyles v. 
State, 947 S.W.2d 754, 756-57 (Ark. 1997) (excluding a confession based on an officer’s 
“false promise” that he would help the defendant if he incriminated himself); Mason v. 
Texas, 116 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tex. App. 2003) (listing the factors which render confessions 
induced by a promise involuntary and inadmissible). But see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Lathan v. 
Deegan, 450 F.2d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding a confession where a detective posed 
as an Army officer who wanted to help the defendant); Whittington v. State, 809 A.2d 721, 
741 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (upholding a confession where the police used fake 
gunpowder to make the suspect believe that a test had shown that she had gunpowder on her 
hand); People v. Henry, 132 A.D.2d 673, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (upholding a 
confession elicited after the defendant was confronted with a fabricated polygraph test 
indicating that he had lied to police). 
 and was commercialized by John E. Reid and Associates, 
 92. This article’s review of interrogation manuals concentrates on the leading 
interrogation manual, FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 
(Jones & Bartlett Pubs. 2004) (1962) [hereinafter INBAU MANUAL], and presents a sampling 
of three other noteworthy and influential interrogation manuals as well.  This is by no means 
a comprehensive review of all interrogation manuals to which American law enforcement 
agencies may have referred historically or today. 
 93. See id. The first edition, published in 1962, was repeatedly cited and implicitly 
criticized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-54 (1966).  Professor Yale Kamisar also 
subjected the first edition to a stinging critique.  See Yale Kamisar, What Is an 
“Involuntary” Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation 
and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963), reprinted in YALE KAMISAR, POLICE 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 1 (1980).  Second and Third 
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Inc.94  The distinctive features of the Reid Technique are: (1) a sharp 
distinction between an interview and an interrogation;95 (2) the accusatory 
nature of the interrogation;96 (3) the premise that a suspect will not easily 
confess because to do so is against his interests;97 (4) and a psychologically 
sophisticated array of methods and procedures by which an interrogator can 
nevertheless elicit a confession.98
The Reid technique is founded on the premise that a suspect will not 
confess unless he is led to believe that doing so is in his own best interest.  
Reid prescribes a nine-step approach for law enforcement officers to 
employ in order to convince suspects that confessing is in their self-
interest.
 
 99  Pursuant to Reid’s technique, convincing a suspect that 
incriminating himself will inure to his benefit requires both persuading the 
suspect that the benefits of confession are relatively high (e.g. internal 
peace, more lenient punishment, end of interrogation) and that the costs of 
confession are relatively low (e.g. futility of continued denial, possibility 
that the crime was morally justified).100
Throughout its description of interrogation tactics, the Inabu Manual 
 
 
Editions were issued in 1967 and 1986, respectively.  Most modern references are to the 
Third Edition, and presumably most law enforcement agencies rely primarily upon that text.  
A Fourth Edition, however, was released in 2004, and references herein, except when 
otherwise specified, are to the Fourth Edition. 
 94. See John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., http://www.reid.com (last visited  February 3, 
2006). 
 95. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 5. 
 96. Id. at 213. 
 97. Id. at 419. 
 98. Id. at 209-398. 
 99. Id. at 419 (“Ordinary people do not act against self-interest without at least a 
temporary perception of a positive gain in doing so.”); see also id. at 212-16 (summarizing 
techniques). 
 100. GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND 
TESTIMONY 62 (1992) (“According to the [Reid] model, a suspect confesses (i.e. tells the 
truth) when the perceived consequences of a confession are more desirable than the anxiety 
generated by the deception (i.e. denial).”); Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem 
of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 913 (2004) 
Drawing on more than fifty years of theoretical and empirical research on rational 
choice approaches to decision-making, both in social psychology and 
microeconomics, the Decision-Making Model [of Confession] . . . focuses on how 
the interrogator’s efforts at persuasion influence a suspect’s perception and 
analysis of his immediate situation, the options available to him, and the likely 
consequences of each possible course of action.  According to this model, the 
interrogator’s goal is to persuade the suspect that the act of admission is in his 
self-interest and therefore the most rational course of action, just as the act of 
continued denial is against his self-interest and therefore the least rational course 
of action.   
Id. 
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makes it clear that employing trickery and deceit is essential to an 
interrogator’s strategy for eliciting a confession.  The use of false evidence 
ploys, in particular, are cited as helpful in convincing the suspect that his 
refusal to confess would be fruitless because overwhelming independent 
incriminating evidence is more than sufficient to obtain a conviction.101  In 
Step 1, the interrogator is advised to accuse the suspect with great 
confidence.102  The Inabu Manual notes that the accusation will have a 
greater impact if the interrogator is accompanied by a thick case file as well 
as visual props such as video tapes, a fingerprint card, shell casings, and 
plastic evidence bags.103  The interrogator need not refer specifically to 
these items; the visual reference will often be enough.104  In Step 2, the 
Inabu Manual draws a distinction between the “emotional” and the “non-
emotional” suspect: the emotional suspect will respond positively to themes 
that empathize with the suspect’s discomfort and minimize his moral 
culpability for the criminal act, whereas the non-emotional suspect will 
respond positively to a rational presentation of his circumstances and his 
possible courses of action.105
 
 101. See Brian C. Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley III, Criminal Interrogation Techniques on 
Trial, SECURITY MGMT., Oct. 1992, at 64, in which the authors advise interrogators 
“[f]alsely [to] tell the suspect about possible evidence implicating him or her in the 
commission of the crime.”); see also LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. KASSIN, 
CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM 77 (1993) 
  Thus, the non-emotional suspect will be 
more likely to respond favorably to the techniques used to disarm the 
emotional suspect—expressions of empathy and minimizations of moral 
culpability—after it is made clear to him that his denials are futile and that 
The interrogator could thus pretend to have strong circumstantial evidence (e.g., 
the suspect’s fingerprints at the scene of the crime), have a policeman pose as an 
eyewitness and identify the suspect in a rigged line-up, or even—through 
elaborate staging devices—try to persuade the suspect that he or she has already 
been implicated by an accomplice or co-suspect. 
Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy 
Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 146 (1997) [hereinafter White, False 
Confessions] (“When the interrogator tells the suspect that there is convincing evidence of 
his guilt, the suspect may feel that maintaining his innocence will be futile.”). 
 102. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 218-19. 
 103. Id. at 217 (noting that “in fact, the file may contain nothing but blank sheets of 
paper”); see also id. at 219 (suggesting that during the initial confrontation the interrogator 
“finger through the case folder to create the impression that it contains material of an 
incriminating nature about the suspect”).  Inbau is careful to advise the interrogator against 
“prepar[ing] false incriminating documents that appear to have been generated through an 
official source” such as the FBI or a crime lab.  Id. at 217 n.2 (citing State v. Cayward, 552 
So.2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)) and stating that the Cayward decision was based on 
the risk that “such falsified documents may find their way into the court system”).  This 
footnote is new for the Fourth Edition. 
 104. Id. at 217. 
 105. Id. at 209-10. 
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the police need not rely on his confession in light of independent 
incriminating evidence.106  In Step 3, the interrogator may continue to use 
the false evidence ploy in order to quickly reject persistent denials by the 
suspect.107  The Inabu Manual recommends additional deceptive ploys 
such as “playing one [suspect] against the other” by leading one to believe 
the other has confessed, even when no such thing has taken place.108  For 
example, the Inabu Manual describes a scenario whereby a police 
department secretary pretends to be typing up a suspect’s confession while 
the other suspect watches.109  The officer then delivers the “confession” to 
the suspect who allegedly confessed and spends a few moments with him, 
leading the other to believe that his alleged cohort is signing his own 
statement.110  All of this is a ruse.  The officer then interrogates the suspect 
who did not “confess” and leads him to believe, without revealing the 
content of his cohort’s statement, that his accomplice implicated both of 
them in the offense.111
The authors of the Inabu Manual assert strongly, particularly in the 
Fourth Edition, that their techniques do not elicit false confessions.  They 
support this in two ways.  First, they instruct the interrogator on how to 
differentiate the truth-telling, innocent suspect from the lying, guilty 
suspect.
 
112
 
 106. Id. at 290-91. 
  Thus, the deceptive interrogation techniques will be used only 
 107. Id. at 306-07. 
 108. Id. at 2932-93. 
 109. Id. at 294-95. 
 110. Id. at 295. 
 111. Id. The manual offers several additional suggestions for using “bluffs” to pit 
suspects against one another.  See id. at 295-98. 
 112. See id. at 107-08 (listing “Indications of Truthfulness” and “Indications of 
Deception”); id. at 121-53 (describing “Behavior Symptom Analysis”); id. at 213 (claiming 
that a guilty person will permit the interrogator to cut off his denials, whereas an innocent 
person will continue to deny the accusation even when the interrogator attempts to cut him 
off); id. at 213-14 (claiming that a guilty person will fall back on economic, religious, or 
moral reasons to explain why he could not have committed the crime of which he is 
accused, whereas an innocent person will continue to insist upon his factual innocence and 
not fall back on such objections); id. at 222-23 (describing the “Behavioral Pause,” in which 
immediately following an initial confrontation with the interrogator the guilty person will 
avoid eye contact, shift uncomfortably, cross his legs, lean back in his chair, and ask 
questions to stall for time, whereas the innocent person will become angry, lean forward in 
his chair, look the interrogator in the eye, and vehemently deny the accusation); id. at 314 
(claiming that “[b]y far, the easiest denials to identify during an interrogation are those 
emanating from an innocent suspect”).  But see id. at 155 (“Although behavior symptoms 
can be helpful in differentiating truth from deception, they are not to be considered 
determinative of the issue.”); id. at 155-71 (noting behavior common to truthful and lying 
suspects and warning of factors that can lead to misinterpretation of behavior symptoms); id. 
at 226 (warning that there are “exceptions” to the general rule that a guilty person will react 
to accusations “in a passive, evasive, and insincere manner” whereas an innocent person 
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on suspects whom the interrogator has determined are guilty.  Second, they 
insist that if a completely innocent person were subjected to the Reid 
Technique, it would not produce a false confession.113
Particularly noteworthy are the authors’ defenses of trickery, deception, 
and the use of false evidence.
 
114  As described infra, the Inabu Manual 
discourages the use of false evidence in some instances.115  As a legal 
matter, the Inabu Manual notes that a confession could be excluded from 
evidence if it appears to be a result of threats or promises.116  And as a 
tactical matter, it warns that the use of false evidence may backfire if the 
suspect realizes he is being deceived and becomes irreversibly 
uncooperative.117  But the authors of the Inabu Manual steadfastly maintain 
that the tactics they recommend cannot cause an innocent person to 
confess.118  Instead, they suggest that deceptive tactics, if employed 
properly, can actually assist law enforcement in determining whether the 
suspect is in fact guilty.119
 
will react “in a sincere, aggressive, and perhaps even hostile manner”). 
  The Inabu Manual further recommends the use 
of a bait question—for instance, “Is there any reason why we would find 
 113. Id. at 212 (“It must be remembered that none of the [Nine] steps is apt to make an 
innocent person confess and that all the steps are legally as well as morally justifiable.”); id. 
at 290 (“[A]n innocent suspect . . . is not apt to confess to a crime merely because the 
investigator expresses high confidence in his guilt . . . .”). 
 114. See id. at 236, 291, 323, 427-29. 
 115. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 116. Id. at 236 (warning that if the interrogator tells the suspect that “the case against him 
is iron clad,” then the only issue to resolve is the length of sentence the suspect will receive, 
leading the interrogator to imply that a confession will result in leniency).  The authors 
indicate that the best way to get around this legal obstacle is to tell a suspect that the 
evidence against him is so strong that his confession isn’t necessary, but that he is being 
offered an opportunity to tell his side of the story.  Id. at 291.  This is legally distinct, the 
Inbau Manual, insists, from telling suspects that the evidence is so strong they are certain to 
be convicted and a confession is the best way to get a lighter sentence.  Id. at 290. 
 117. Id. at 323 (“While it is perfectly legal to verbally lie about evidence connecting a 
suspect to a crime, it is a risky technique to employ. . . . A miscalculation . . . may cause the 
technique to backfire and fortify a guilty suspect’s resistance.”); id. at 429 (“Introducing 
fictitious evidence during an interrogation presents a risk that the guilty suspect may detect 
the investigator’s bluff, resulting in a significant loss of credibility and sincerity.  For this 
reason, we recommend that this tactic be used as a last resort effort.”). 
 118. Id. at 290 (“[A]n innocent suspect . . . is not apt to confess to a crime merely because 
the investigator expresses high confidence in his guilt.”); id. at 429 (“It is our clear position 
that merely introducing fictitious evidence during an interrogation would not cause an 
innocent person to confess.”).  The authors largely base their conclusions on the notion that 
it is not “natural” for people to confess to crimes they did not commit.  See id. at 428 (“The 
important question to answer is whether it is human nature to accept responsibility for 
something we did not do in the face of contrary evidence.”); id. at 429 (“Under this 
circumstance, the natural human reaction would be one of anger and mistrust toward the 
investigator.”). 
 119. See id. at 284. 
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your fingerprints at the scene of the crime?”120  If the suspect adamantly 
denies it, then the interrogator is advised not to bring up the false evidence 
again.121  “However, if the suspect’s behavioral response indicates a lack of 
confidence or uncertainty as to whether the evidence might exist, during 
the interrogation the investigator can present that same evidence in a more 
definitive matter.”122  The Inabu Manual suggests that interrogators tread 
cautiously in this area.  This admonition, however, is clearly motivated by 
the authors’ concerns about the legal admissibility of a resulting confession 
and the risk that false evidence ploys could backfire and fail to produce any 
confession at all than from any perceived danger that the techniques might 
result in a false confession.123
Although the Inabu Manual (and its Reid & Associates commercialized 
counterpart) is the most widely used,
 
124 there are several other noteworthy 
police interrogation resources. 125  O’Hara & O’Hara’s Fundamentals of 
Criminal Investigation (“O’Hara & O’Hara Manual”)126 is a 900-page 
manual that devotes several chapters to interrogation.  The authors 
recommend a panoply of interrogation techniques, including the use of a 
false evidence ploy to produce a confession.  Making reference to the 
“average person[s’] . . . mystical notions of the power of scientific crime 
detection,” the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual suggests that such persons “will 
accept practically any claims that science may make.”127  The O’Hara & 
O’Hara Manual further advises that a detective may “mix pseudoscience in 
his statements.”128
In a homicide, the interrogator can refer to hair found at the scene of the 
  It offers specific examples: 
 
 120. Id. at 194 (emphasis omitted).  Note that the Inbau Manual recommends the use of a 
question during a non-accusatory interview.  “During an interrogation, however, the 
investigator often must express more confidence that the evidence, in fact, does exist or will 
shortly become available.”  Id. at 284. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. The authors recommend some specific limitations on the use of the technique.  False 
evidence ploys should not be used when the suspect claims not to remember what happened, 
and when the suspect is youthful or mentally impaired.  Id. at 429.  See also id. at 160-71 
(describing “factors that may lead to misinterpretation of behavior symptoms”); id. at 290 
(instructing interrogators not to “attempt to convince a suspect who claims not to recall 
whether he committed the crime, that he must have committed it”). 
 124. Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221, 222 
(1997); White, False Confessions, supra note 101, at 118. 
 125. All three manuals discussed herein are listed in WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 
101, at 65. 
 126. CHARLES E. O’HARA & GREGORY L. O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION (7th ed. 2003) [hereinafter O’HARA & O’HARA MANUAL]. 
 127. Id. at 149. 
 128. Id. at 149-50. 
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crime, which can be shown, under the microscope, to be the suspect’s 
hair.  For added realism, the suspect can be invited to look into the 
microscope.  In a document case, such as a forgery or a threatening letters 
case, a comparison of handwriting can be represented as being 
conclusive.”129
The O’Hara & O’Hara Manual goes on to depict a scenario prescribing 
the use of false fingerprint evidence during an interrogation. 
 
Fingerprints are the most effective form of evidence.  The layman 
believes that they can be left on any object.  The investigator should select 
some object which was known to have been touched and should face the 
suspect with the object.  It does bear fingerprints and the fingerprints have 
been photographed.  The interrogator can show at a discreet distance a 
small photograph of a latent fingerprint.  The imaginative investigator can 
create his own dramatic effects such as having the interrogation 
interrupted by the delivery of a message to the effect that the fingerprints 
on the weapon have been identified, or that the handwriting has been 
positively compared.130
Although the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual acknowledges that deceptive 
interrogation techniques, at their extreme, can lead to false confessions, it 
leaves interrogators only with the tautological advice that “Trickery and 
deception may be used if it is not of such a nature as to make an innocent 
person confess.”
 
131  In fact, the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual refers 
interrogators to the Inabu Manual, which provides a similarly conclusory 
“rule of thumb.”132  The interrogator is to ask himself, “Is what I am about 
to do, or say, apt to make an innocent person confess?”133 If the answer is 
no, then the interrogator may proceed with his deceptive tactic.134  Like the 
Inabu Manual, the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual juxtaposes a strong 
endorsement of police trickery with a skeptical attitude toward the risk of 
false confessions.135
Another interrogation manual is Macdonald & Michaud’s The 
Confession (“Macdonald & Michaud Manual”).
 
136
 
 129. Id. at 150. 
  In contrast to the Inabu 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 177; see also id. at 147. 
 132. Id. at 147 (citing Fred E. Inbau, Legally Permissible Criminal Interrogation Tactics 
and Techniques, 4 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 249 (1976)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Like the Inbau Manual, the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual also relies on the belief that 
interrogators can more or less determine whether a suspect is truthful or lying by examining 
his body language and physiological symptoms.  Id. at 152-53. 
 136. JOHN M. MACDONALD & DAVID L. MICHAUD, THE CONFESSION: INTERROGATION AND 
CRIMINAL PROFILES FOR POLICE OFFICERS (1987) [hereinafter MACDONALD & MICHAUD 
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ManuaL and the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual, the Macdonald & Michaud 
Manual strongly advises against outright trickery—not out of a concern 
that such tactics may induce false confessions, but out of a concern that the 
technique may backfire if the suspect learns of the deception. 137  The 
Macdonald & Michaud Manual, however, stops short of discouraging 
detectives from implying that substantial false evidence exists: “A large 
case folder on the desk suggests that the investigation has revealed much 
information, yet the folder may contain records on another case.”138  Aside 
from its general disapproval of explicit deception, the Macdonald & 
Michaud Manual corresponds  with the Inabu Manual and the O’Hara & 
O’Hara Manual on two important points: first, the Macdonald & Michaud 
Manual shares a skepticism about false confessions;139 and second, all 
three manuals rely on a confidence that police officers can detect, during an 
interview, whether the suspect is guilty or innocent.140
Another interrogation manual is The Gentle Art of Interviewing and 
Interrogation by Royal & Schutt (“Royal & Schutt Manual”).
 
141  This 
volume is far less comprehensive than the other manuals discussed.142
 
MANUAL]. 
  Its 
approach to the use of deceptive interrogation tactics is ambivalent.  The 
 137. Id. at 23. 
Do not make any false statements.  Do not tell him his fingerprints were found at 
the scene if they were not found at the scene.  Do not tell him he was identified by 
an eyewitness if he was not identified by an eyewitness.  If he catches you in a 
false statement, he will not longer trust you, he will assume that you do not have 
sufficient evidence to prove his guilt, and his self-confidence will go up. 
Id.; see also id. at 46 (“Reminders: No threats, no promises, no false statements.”). 
 138. Id. at 19. 
 139. Id. at 7 (explaining that false confessions are brought about by a “wish for publicity 
and notoriety,” warning that some people “who make false confessions . . . later commit 
murder,” and stating that “[o]ther reasons for false confessions are to obtain a bed for the 
night in freezing weather, or to obtain transport to a distant city where the crime occurred”). 
 140. Id. at 36-38, 40-43 (listing “clues to deception”).  Tellingly, many of the authors’ 
“clues to decpetion” are inconsistent or self-contradictory.  “Brief answers” and 
“excessively detailed answers” both indicate that a suspect is lying.  Id. at 36.  In addition, 
“politeness,” “irritability,” and “short-lived anger” are all sure signs of deception.  Id. at 38.  
The suspect who avoids eye contact, as well as the suspect who engages in “prolonged eye 
contact,” is lying.  Id. at 41.  At times the authors’ claims are simply bizarre.  For example, 
if you can see white under the suspect’s iris, then “the detective has touched on an area that 
is troubling to the subject.”  Id. 
 141. ROBERT F. ROYAL & STEVEN R. SCHUTT, THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND 
INTERROGATION: A PROFESSIONAL MANUAL AND GUIDE (1976) [hereinafter ROYAL & 
SCHUTT MANUAL]. 
 142. For instance, there is a section devoted to “Interviewing Women,” in which the 
reader is warned that “[a]ny attempt on the part of the interviewer to inhibit the flow of 
subjective content, especially if strong emotions or feelings are involved, will usually result 
in an almost immediate breakdown of rapport.” Id. at 111. 
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Royal & Schutt Manual never discusses the use of false evidence ploys 
expressly, though they suggest that bluffing may be permissible: “In some 
cases, the use of deception, such as staged events or bluffs, may be 
acceptable.  There can be no justification, however, for deliberate lies or 
false promises.”143  The Royal & Schutt Manual is murky as to where to 
draw the line between “the use of deception . . . or bluffs” and “deliberate 
lies.”  The Royal & Schutt Manual warns interrogators, “Never bluff if 
there is the least chance that the suspect will detect the bluff.”144  Without 
expressly advocating that interrogators use a false evidence ploy, the Royal 
& Schutt Manual notes that “[a] suspect is usually more convinced by 
specific illustrations and physical evidence than he is by alleged statements 
of his guilt or by circumstantial evidence.”145  Thus, the authors provide the 
reader with the information he needs to use a false evidence ploy against a 
suspect, without expressly advocating the use of this tactic.  Later in the 
book, the authors write: “Bluffs or staged situations are sometimes used, 
but dependence on them should be avoided.”146
B. Critiques of Leading Interrogation Techniques Which Explain Why 
Suspects May Confess Falsely When Confronted With False Evidence 
and Other Deception 
  The Royal & Schutt 
Manual does not, however, elaborate on the reasons for this advice, nor 
does it ever address the risk that bluffing about the existence of evidence 
may lead to false confessions. 
A number of critiques of the leading interrogation techniques prescribed 
by Reid, Inbau and others have described the reasons that the use of 
deception and trickery during interrogations leads to false confessions.  
Most of these critiques describe the kinds of cost/benefit analyses suspects 
undertake before deciding to incriminate themselves, regardless of guilt or 
innocence.  The critiques and related theories help illustrate the impact 
trickery and deception, particularly an exaggeration or misrepresentation of 
the existence or quantum of independent incriminating evidence, have on 
even innocent suspects. 
i. Rational Choice: A Theory of False Confession 
Critics of the Reid Technique employ what they call a “rational choice” 
 
 143. Id. at 68. 
 144. Id. at 121. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 146. 
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model to explain how false confessions can occur.147  The model is 
consistent with Reid & Inbau’s theory that a rational person will do what he 
perceives to be in his best interest.148  Although most suspects enter an 
interrogation room believing that it is against their best interest to confess, 
the object of the Reid Technique is to convince suspects that confession is 
in their best interest.149  Underlying the rational choice model is a 
definition of “best interest” that weighs the costs against the benefits of a 
potential course of action.150  To this end, the Reid Technique requires 
interrogators to convince suspects that the benefits of confession will be 
relatively high (e.g. lenient sentencing, end of stressful interrogation, 
release from custody) and that the costs of his confession will be relatively 
low (e.g. he will be convicted anyway because there is enough other 
evidence to prove the case against him).151
From the law enforcement perspective, if the police were initially correct 
in their determination that the suspect is guilty, then their manipulation of 
what the suspect perceives as his best interest will produce a just outcome.  
Under the rational choice model, however, the suspect’s actual guilt or 
innocence has little bearing on whether he confesses; rather, he will confess 
whenever the costs of confession as he perceives them are outweighed by 
the benefits of confession, regardless of his culpability.
 
152
It is with respect to the perceived costs of confession that false evidence 
ploys are particularly salient.  When a suspect is confronted with seemingly 
incontrovertible evidence of his guilt, he is likely to conclude that he is 
certain to be convicted even though he is innocent.
 
153
 
 147. See generally Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: 
Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979 (1997) [hereinafter Ofshe 
& Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely] (theorizing that an innocent person could confess 
when convinced that confession is the most rational course of action, given his 
circumstances and options as he perceives them); see also  GUDJONSSON, supra note 
  The suspect may 
believe that he has been framed somehow, that there was a mistake in the 
100, at 
64-65; Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 913. 
 148. See Jayne & Buckley, supra note 101, at 11 (“A psychologically healthy suspect 
will not engage in behavior that will jeopardize [his] self-interests.”). 
 149. Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 913 (“According to this model, the interrogator’s goal 
is to persuade the suspect that the act of admission is in his self-interest.”); see also supra 
notes 93-100 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 147150, at 985 
(stating that the interrogator’s objective is to convince the suspect that the “marginal 
benefits of confessing outweigh the marginal costs”). 
 151. See id. at 990. 
 152. See Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 221; White, 
False Confessions, supra note 101, at 119, 133. 
 153. See Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 146; see also 
White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 23, at 1242-43. 
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analysis of the evidence, or that he is just very unlucky in that all the 
evidence points to him, an innocent person.154  Regardless of what the 
suspect believes the source of the error to be, he is likely to believe that any 
reasonable jury, viewing the evidence, will be convinced of his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.155  When faced with overwhelming evidence 
against him, the innocent suspect may rationally conclude that the costs of 
his confession are relatively low because he is likely to be convicted 
regardless of whether he confesses.156 Weighing against these lowered 
costs of confession are its relatively high benefits; the suspect may be 
spared a harsh penalty in the long term,157 and in the short term the stress 
of an interrogation may be ameliorated or truncated.158
 
 154. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 
  In other words, a 
suspect’s cost-benefit calculation changes when independent incriminating 
evidence is added to the equation.  Whereas confessing to a crime for 
which the police have little independent evidence (regardless of whether 
one committed the offense) would ordinarily carry extraordinary costs and 
no benefits, the presence (or apparition) of overwhelming evidence flips the 
cost-benefit calculation such that one has some reason to confess and may 
147, at 1009 (“For an 
innocent suspect who naively trusts the police and believes that they would not lie, the 
cumulative effect of an endless stream of false evidence can be devastating.”). 
 155. See id. at 1013 (“The fact that the suspect’s denials of the evidence has failed to 
convince the investigator of the his [sic] innocence is intended to serve as a demonstration.  
The implication is that he will also be unable to convince a prosecutor, a judge, or a jury of 
his innocence.  The investigator strives to create the impression that because his opinion is 
based on hard facts, all other equally reasonable and informed persons will reach the same 
conclusion.”); see also Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 
222 (showing that in fact mock jury studies have demonstrated that confessions are more 
potent than eyewitness evidence and other forms of human evidence and that juries do not 
fully discount confessions even when they are supposed to legally). 
 156. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 147, at 985-86 
(“Police elicit the decision to confess from the guilty by leading them to believe that the 
evidence against them is overwhelming, that their fate is certain (whether or not they 
confess), and that there are advantages that follow if they confess.”). 
 157. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 916-17. 
 158. See White, False Confessions, supra note 101, at 146.  The prospect of being 
released from custody after hours of interrogation is enough to induce some suspects to 
confess.  See Welsh S. White, Confessions Induced By Broken Government Promises, 43 
DUKE L.J. 947, 982-83 (1994) (discussing the case of Leo Bruce, who confessed to killing 
several people at a Thai Buddhist temple near Phoenix after an FBI agent falsely told Bruce 
that police had evidence establishing that he was at the temple the night of the murders; 
even after he repeatedly denied involvement in the murders, he was interrogated for several 
more hours until he finally confessed; Bruce was never brought to trial, because evidence 
discovered after he confessed established that his confession was false); see also White, 
Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 979, 1020-21 (reporting that Bruce 
confessed after he was questioned for thirteen hours; when asked why he would confess to 
capital crimes, he replied, “I just wanted it to end right there.  I wanted to sleep. I was 
exhausted.”). 
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believe that he has little reason to remain silent. 
According to the rational choice model, then, two components of the 
Reid Technique converge to create an arguably significant risk of false 
confession.  First is the authors’ unjustified confidence in the interrogator’s 
ability to discern the guilt or innocence of the suspect based on the 
suspect’s behavior, body language, and other armchair psychology.159  
Second is the interrogator’s liberal use of trickery, deceit, and fictitious 
evidence to convince the presumed guilty suspect that he is certain to be 
convicted.160  If the interrogator truly were able to know with any certainty 
whether the suspect was guilty or innocent, then the false evidence ploys 
might be justified as a means of rendering criminal interrogations and 
investigations more efficient.  At the same time, if the interrogator did not 
use false evidence to manipulate the suspect’s perceived self-interest, then 
the interrogator’s occasional error in prejudging the guilt of the suspect 
would be unlikely to result in false confessions.  The combination, 
however, of these two errors—an observational error that occurs when the 
officers erroneously presume guilt and an ethical error when officers 
deliberately mislead suspects—can lead a suspect to confess even when he 
knows he is actually innocent.161
 
 159. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 
 
100, at 48; Kassin, The Psychology of Confession 
Evidence, supra note 124, at 222 
Research has consistently shown that people are poor intuitive judges of truth and 
deception.  In fact, even so-called experts who make such judgments for a 
living—police interrogators; judges; psychiatrists; and polygraphers for the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and the 
military—are highly prone to error. 
(internal citations omitted); see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Behavioral Confirmation in the 
Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 
188-89 (2003); Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 219-20 
It is possible that police who commit themselves to [measuring their success by 
their ability to extract a confession] are, at times, not merely blinded by their 
initial beliefs [that the suspect is guilty] but motivated to reinforce them . . . [A] 
warehouse of psychology research suggests that once people form an impression, 
they unwittingly seek, interpret, and create behavioral data that verify it. 
Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, “I’m Innocent!”: Effects of Training on Judgments of 
Truth and Deception in the Interrogation Room, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 500-01 
(1999); Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review 
of Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 35, 40 (2004) [hereinafter Kassin & 
Gudjonson, The Psychology of Confessions] (discussing psychological tests which showed 
that people who have undergone training in judging the accuracy of confessions are actually 
“significantly less accurate than those who did not [undergo the training] . . . though they 
were more confident in their judgments [of guilt or innocence]”); Christian A. Meissner & 
Saul M. Kassin, “He’s Guilty!”: Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 470 (2002). 
 160. GUDJONSSON, supra note 100, at 48. 
 161. Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 124, at 220.  In fact, 
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ii. Observational Study of Police Interrogation Methods 
The question of how often police use trickery in interrogation is hard to 
answer.  In 1996, Professor Richard Leo published a quantitative study, 
Inside the Interrogation Room, which—based on his personal observation 
of police interrogations in a major urban police department—examined the 
details of police interrogation techniques.162  This is not a study of false 
confessions, so Leo did not explore the likelihood that any one of these 
techniques would cause the suspect to confess to a crime that he did not 
commit.  Rather, the study yielded data on which interrogation techniques 
were prevalent, whether they were successful at eliciting confessions, and 
what kind of suspects were most susceptible to each kind of interrogation 
technique.163
Leo observed that it was routine for detectives to begin an interrogation 
by confronting the suspect with evidence of his guilt and then suggesting 
that it was in his best interest to confess.
 
164  In fact, this technique was 
utilized in approximately ninety percent of the interrogations Leo 
observed.165  In eighty-five percent of the interrogations Leo observed, the 
police confronted the suspect with actual (not fictitious) evidence of his 
guilt.166  In thirty percent of the interrogations, the police used false 
evidence to try to convince the suspect to confess.167  Leo’s study 
concluded that the use of evidence against the suspect was a highly 
effective method of eliciting self-incriminating information.168  Moreover, 
it turned out that the presentation of false evidence was slightly more 
effective than the use of actual evidence.169
 
psychological studies show that innocence may actually render a suspect more likely to 
submit to interrogation, waive his rights, and confess to a crime that he erroneously believes 
the objective evidence will disprove, even in the face of false evidence ploys.  Id. at 224. 
  Detectives were successful in 
eliciting self-incriminating information from suspects in seventy-eight 
percent of the cases where suspects were told of actual evidence, and in 
eighty-three percent of the cases where the police lied to suspects about the 
 162. See generally Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996). 
 163. Id. at 268 (“This Article takes the reader inside the interrogation room to understand 
the characteristics, context, and outcome of contemporary police interrogation practices in 
America.  It is the only study to do so in more than twenty-five years, and the first ever to do 
so in any sustained, explicit, or comprehensive manner.”). 
 164. Id. at 279. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 277 tbl.5. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. at 293. 
 169. See id. 
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existence of incriminating evidence.170
Leo’s study also demonstrated that suspects from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds or with prior felony convictions were more vulnerable to 
these techniques than others.
 
171
In addition to Leo’s empirical report on prevalent interrogation 
techniques, several significant psychological studies on confessions have 
produced results which help explain the false evidence ploys’ coercive 
effect.
 
172
iii. Psychological Analysis of Interrogation Techniques: Maximization and 
Minimization 
 
Psychology professor Saul Kassin described the Reid Technique as 
essentially boiling down to two interrogation methods used frequently, and 
sometimes in combination, by the police.173  The first is minimization: the 
interrogator takes a sympathetic approach, telling the suspect that what he 
did was understandable, justifiable, and will not produce significant 
adverse consequences.174  This generally works well with emotional or 
“remorseful” suspects who are easily lulled into a false sense of security by 
the awareness that someone else empathizes with their plight.175
The second interrogation method Professor Kassin identifies is 
maximization: the interrogator aggressively confronts the suspect with the 
magnitude of his situation, hoping to convince him that he is in serious 
trouble and likely to be punished severely.
 
176  This generally works with 
“non-emotional” suspects who are able to logically evaluate the costs and 
benefits of their situation and comprehend that their best option is 
confession.177  The evidence bluff is an overt form of maximization:178
The interrogator would thus pretend to have strong circumstantial 
evidence (e.g., the suspect’s fingerprints at the scene of the crime), have a 
 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. at 295.  The use of false evidence in the interrogation room was particularly 
effective with suspects from lower economic class backgrounds: eighty-eight percent of 
those suspects provided self-incriminating information.  Id.  Suspects with prior felony 
records were even more vulnerable: ninety-six percent of those suspects provided self-
incriminating information when confronted with false evidence against them.  Id. 
 172. See infra notes 173-193 and accompanying text. 
 173. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 124, at 223-24. 
 174. Id. at 223. 
 175. See GUDJONSSON,  supra note 100, at 38. 
 176. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 124, at 223. 
 177. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 100, at 38; see also INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 
210, 290 (discussing interrogation techniques for emotional and non-emotional offenders). 
 178. See Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 124, at 223. 
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policeman pose as an eyewitness and identify the suspect in a rigged line-
up, or even—through elaborate staging devices—try to persuade the 
suspect that he or she has already been implicated by an accomplice or co-
suspect.179
According to Kassin, interrogators recognize that non-emotional 
suspects are likely to respond “logically” to their perceived circumstances.  
The non-emotional suspect, confronted with overwhelming evidence 
against him, is expected to make the only rational decision available to 
him: confessing to the crime.
 
180
As discussed above, suspects confronted with what appears to be 
overwhelming evidence against them may confess falsely merely because 
they perceive the benefits of confessing outweigh its costs.
 
181  Confessions 
are more likely to occur when the fictitious evidence is presented as strong, 
perhaps overwhelming.182  Suspects tend to believe that “scientific” 
evidence—such as DNA, fingerprints, and even lie detector tests183
Evidence ploys that are based on well known technical or modern 
scientific procedures are likely to be more influential because the mere 
mention of a special technology—whether it is well-known or new—
carries the prestige and incomprehensibility of modern science.  Both the 
guilty and the innocent have a harder time explaining away evidence that 
is allegedly derived from scientific technologies.
—are 
generally accepted by juries as infallible proof of guilt: 
184
Suspects generally view witness evidence—such as eyewitness 
statements, line-up or photo array identifications, and statements from co-
defendants and jailhouse snitches
 
185—to be significantly less 
threatening.186  Additionally, suspects are more intimidated when the 
interrogator provides specific details of the damaging evidence rather than 
general assertions that strong evidence exists.187
 
 179. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 
 Psychologically, the 
evidence has a greater impact on the suspect when it is presented visually, 
either in a plastic bag, a thick manila case folder, or as a printed report from 
101, at 77. 
 180. For a comprehensive description of the various types of false confessions, see id., at 
225-26; see also GUDJONSSON, supra note 100, at 226-28. 
 181. See supra notes 147-158 and accompanying text. 
 182. See Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 124, at 225; Ofshe 
& Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 147, at 1013. 
 183. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 147, at 1023-38. 
 184. Id. at 1023. 
 185. See id. at 1015-22. 
 186. White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 23, at 1243. 
 187. Id. 
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the laboratory.188
Because interrogators are well aware that “maximization” is most 
effective when presented visually, with specificity, and in “scientific” form, 
they are likely to shape their false evidence ploys to fit these criteria.  
When police use real evidence as an interrogation tactic, of course, they are 
limited to whatever form of evidence they actually possess—statements 
from an eyewitness, for example.  But when the police are permitted to 
invent the evidence for the purposes of bluffing the suspect into a 
confession, they are at liberty to create an illusion of the existence of 
evidence most likely to impress the suspect.
 
189  Sometimes this means 
employing more “science fiction” than actual science. For example, Ofshe 
and Leo have reported interrogators’ presentation of imaginary technology 
such as a test purporting to lift fingerprints from a corpse, or a method 
purported to prove scientifically whether a particular suspect fired the 
murder weapon. 190
Finally, most scholars agree that false evidence ploys are more likely to 
be successful when the suspect being interrogated is especially vulnerable 
to manipulation.  Kassin suggests that vulnerability factors include “youth, 
interpersonal trust, naiveté, suggestibility, lack of intelligence, stress, 
fatigue, alcohol, or drug use.”
 
191  Gudjonsson has conducted extensive 
studies on suggestibility, the details of which are beyond the scope of this 
article.192
 
 188. See id. 
  Even the Inabu Manual acknowledges that certain classes of 
 189. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely supra note 147, at 1015-50.  
Ofshe & Leo provide testimonials from suspects and excerpts from dozens of interrogation 
transcripts, impressively demonstrating that law enforcement officials really do use the 
interview techniques described in the literature.  Id.  For a quantitative analysis based on 
observation of police interrogations, see generally Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 
supra note 162.  For items in the popular media confirming police use of deceptive tactics in 
their attempts to elicit confessions, see Disclosure: Inside the Interrogation Room (CBC 
News television broadcast Jan. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/disclosure/archives/030128_confess/murder.html (reporting false 
confessions in a murder case and criticizing the Reid Technique); Fresh Air (National 
Public Radio broadcast Feb. 25, 2005) (interview with former NYPD Detective Bill Clark) 
(originally broadcast Nov. 1, 1995), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/rundowns/rundown.php?prgId=13&prgDate=02-25-2005 
(stating that detectives regularly lie to suspects about the evidence against them in order to 
elicit a confession). 
 190. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 147, at 1026 
(reporting San Diego detectives’ “use” of a non-existent technology, the “Cobalt Blue” test, 
that can lift fingerprints from a corpse); id. at 1033 (reporting investigators’ invention of the 
“Neutron Proton Negligence Intelligence Test” to convince a suspect that there was 
scientific proof he had fired the murder weapon). 
 191. Id. at 227. 
 192. See GUDJONSSON,  supra note 100, at 131-64. 
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suspects, such as juveniles and the mentally impaired, are not always suited 
for complex interrogation techniques.193
C. Inbau’s Defense 
 
The Inabu Manual devotes an entire chapter—completely new in the 
Fourth Edition—to responding to the “critics of police interrogation.”194
As a general guideline, areas that are considered impermissible as topics 
of threats or promises during an interrogation address real consequences.  
Real consequences affect the suspect’s physical or emotional health, 
personal freedom (arrest, jail, or prison), or financial status (losing a job 
or paying large fines).  It should be emphasized that merely discussing 
real consequences during an interrogation does not constitute coercion.  It 
is only when the investigator uses real consequences as leverage to induce 
a confession through the use of threats or promises that coercion may be 
claimed.  Our long-standing position has been that interrogation 
incentives that are apt to cause an innocent person to confess are 
improper.
  In 
this chapter, the Inabu Manual responds to claims that standard 
interrogation practices produce false confessions.  The authors emphasize 
that the Reid Technique does not instruct interrogators to make any threats 
or promises involving “real consequences”: 
195
Instead of making explicit threats and promises, the Inabu Manual 
recommends that interrogators merely make ambiguous statements that 
could be interpreted by a suspect as a threat or promise.  For instance, the 
Inabu Manual insists that there is a difference between a detective who 
explicitly promises the suspect that he will talk to the judge and make sure 
he is put on probation and a detective who merely suggests that he will 
include in his report information from a confession that could reflect 
favorably on the suspect.
 
196  Moreover, the Inabu Manual insists that the 
“self-preservation instincts” of an innocent suspect will withstand the 
standard interrogation techniques prescribed in the manual.197
 
 193. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 
  It also 
maintains that false confessions result only from interrogations in which 
“improper inducements, such as threats and promises, or deprivation of 
92, at 429; see also Singletary v. Fischer, 365 F. Supp. 
2d 328, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Inbau’s Fourth Edition as warning against the use of 
techniques “designed to persuade” suspects “who are unintelligent, uneducated, and come 
from a low cultural background”). 
 194. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 411-47; see also id. at 412 (“Even critics of police 
interrogation agree that most confessions are true.”). 
 195. Id. at 418. 
 196. Id. at 420. 
 197. Id. at 447. 
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biological needs were used.”198
Critics such as Kassin doubt that suspects distinguish clearly between 
explicit threats and promises and more ambiguous language with 
underlying threats and promises.
 
199
An innocent suspect who is told that it is important to explain the reason 
behind committing the crime will predictably reject the investigator’s 
entire premise and explain that he had no involvement in the crime 
whatsoever.  A guilty suspect who hears exactly this same message may 
start to entertain possible benefits as to why it might be important to tell 
the truth.
 The Inabu Manual nevertheless 
insists—without the benefit of empirical corroborating evidence—that even 
if the guilty suspect does not make such a distinction, the difference is 
enough to prevent the innocent from falsely confessing: 
200
In other words, according to the leading interrogation manual, an 
implied threat or promise will have the same effect as an explicit threat or 
promise when police are dealing with guilty suspects.  Innocent suspects, 
however, will not respond to implied threats or promises. 
 
The argument posited by the Inabu Manual fails entirely to address the 
risks attending the false evidence ploy.  The false evidence ploy is a type of 
implied threat: if the suspect does not confess, then he will be convicted 
with independent incriminating evidence without the opportunity to enter 
any mitigating statement into the record.  False evidence, when seemingly 
irrefutable, is therefore unlikely to have a greater influence on guilty 
persons than on innocent persons.  An innocent person and a guilty person 
alike are likely to see the “evidence” for what it appears to be—a threat of 
dire consequences awaiting them regardless of whether they confess.  In 
fact, by any rational calculation, a confession may ameliorate the otherwise 
inevitable and unhappy consequences awaiting the suspect, whether he is 
guilty or innocent. 
The Inabu Manual attempts to take up this challenge again later in the 
chapter.201  The authors insist that the use of false evidence alone would 
never cause an innocent person to confess.202
 
 198. Id. 
  Instead, they insist that false 
 199. See Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 124, at 223-24; Saul 
M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating 
Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 235 (1991) 
[hereinafter Kassin & McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions]; see also INBAU 
MANUAL, supra note 92, at 420. 
 200. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 421-22. 
 201. See id. at 427-29. 
 202. Id. at 428.  “Would a suspect, innocent of a homicide, bury his head in his hands and 
confess because he was told that the murder weapon was found during a search of his home? 
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evidence would only cause a false confession when coupled with the 
interrogator’s use of a “threat of inevitable consequences” or a promise of 
leniency.203 The Reid Technique’s admonishment against threats is 
considered sufficient protection against false confessions even if the 
interrogation involves false evidence ploys and other forms of trickery.204
The Inabu Manual defense is founded on the notion that a suspect will 
make a carefully considered rational analysis of the options he is presented 
with and will only confess if he knows he is guilty and knows he stands to 
lose more if he continues to deceive police.  This premise fails to take into 
account facts that the empirical laboratory studies discussed in the ensuing 
section and that real-life false confession cases have borne out
 
205: that 
some suspects—juveniles, the mentally impaired206—are incapable of 
making such finely calibrated decisions; that a skilled interrogator’s 
persistence and intimidation of a suspect may overbear the will even of 
mature, mentally intact suspects; and that some suspects simply decide that 
even if they confess falsely the objective evidence will later corroborate 
their claims of innocence.207
Some of the seminal empirical studies on false confessions help to 
establish these points. 
 
D. Empirical Studies  Establishing That Confronting Suspects With 
False Evidence And Other Deceptive Interrogation Practices Induces 
Suspects to Confess Falsely 
Scholars have performed a number of empirical studies of false 
confessions.  The studies discussed in this article fall into two general 
categories.  First, psychology experiments conducted in a laboratory; 
second non-observational statistical analyses of confessions later shown to 
be false. 
 
Of course not!”  Id. 
 203. Id. at 429. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False 
Confessions: Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 126 
(1996); see also Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 
490-92 (detailing the case of Juan Rivera, a mentally handicapped twenty-year old, who 
signed two police-written confessions admitting he raped and murdered a young girl, and 
whose conviction was later overturned). 
 206. See Singletary v. Fischer, 365 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 207. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions, supra note 159, at 56. 
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i. Laboratory Experiment 
Saul Kassin established an experiment to test the hypothesis that 
“presentation of false evidence can lead individuals . . . to confess to an act 
they did not commit.”208  Each subject in the experiment was asked to take 
a typing test on a computer, with half the tests conducted at a fast pace and 
half at a slow pace.209  All subjects were specifically warned not to hit the 
“ALT” key because this would cause the computer to crash and data to be 
lost.210  Although none of the subjects actually hit the “ALT” key, a 
computer crash was simulated and the subjects were accused of doing 
so.211  Initially, each subject confidently denied the accusation.212  But 
then, in half the scenarios, another subject in the room (actually a plant, 
working with Professor Kassin) claimed to have witnessed the subject hit 
the “ALT” key as he had been expressly instructed not to do.213
The experiment sought to measure three different kinds of responses: 
compliance, internalization, and confabulation.
  The 
experiment then measured the subjects’ response to this presentation of 
“false evidence.” 
214  Compliance was 
detected if the subject agreed to sign a statement admitting to having hit the 
“ALT” key, thereby crashing the program and destroying data.215  
Internalization was detected if the subject, when asked later by another 
plant what had happened, reported that she had hit the wrong key and 
caused the computer to crash (rather than, for instance, “They said I hit the 
wrong key”).216  Confabulation was detected if the subject was actually 
able to recall and describe how and when she hit the wrong key, despite 
having never done so.217
The experiment produced the following remarkable results:
 
218
 
 
 NO WITNESS WITNESS 
FORM OF 
INFLUENCE 
Slow Pace Fast Pace Slow Pace Fast Pace 
 
 208. Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 205, at 126. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. (emphasis added). 
 217. Id. at 126-27. 
 218. See id. at 127 tbl.1. 
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Compliance 35% 65% 89% 100% 
Internalization 0 12% 44% 65% 
Confabulation 0 0 6% 35% 
 
As the results demonstrate, the subjects were much more likely to 
confess when confronted with false evidence against them, though they 
were less likely to do so when the pace of the typing test was slow, 
presumably leaving them with more certainty as to which keys they 
actually hit.219
ii. False Confession Studies: Empirical Data on the Role of Police Trickery 
In Actual Wrongful Convictions. 
 
The landmark empirical study of “miscarriages of justice,” in which the 
innocent were convicted, is arguably Bedau & Radelet’s 1987 study 
published in the Stanford Law Review (“Bedau & Radelet Study”).220  
Although a full analysis of the Bedau & Radelet Study is beyond the scope 
of this article, their study provided much-needed statistical support for the 
claim that wrongful conviction of the innocent is a real and ongoing 
phenomenon.221  Identifying 350 potentially capital cases of the twentieth 
century in which a miscarriage of justice had occurred, Bedau & Radelet 
concluded that the wrongful conviction was caused by a police-induced 
false confession in fourteen percent of the cases.222
Since Bedau & Radelet, two studies have examined the phenomenon of 
  The Bedau-Radelet 
Study, though groundbreaking, does not provide a breakdown of the false 
confessions showing what kind of interrogation techniques were employed 
to induce the suspect to confess.  Therefore, although it is certainly 
significant in demonstrating the frequency of false confessions, it is of 
limited use in an analysis focused on police use of false evidence ploys. 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. See generally Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in 
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987); see also Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, 
at 902 (describing Bedau & Radelet’s article as a “watershed study”); Leo & Ofshe, The 
Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 432 n.9 (“The leading contemporary 
research in this tradition is Bedau and Radelet’s landmark study of miscarriages of 
justice.”). 
 221. White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 23, at 1227; see also Samuel R. Gross et al., 
Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, supra note 22, at 527 (“The rate of 
exonerations increased sharply over the fifteen year period of this study, from an average of 
twelve a year from 1989 through 1994, to an average of forty-two a year since 2000.”). 
 222. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 220, at 57-58. Perjury by prosecution witnesses and 
mistaken eye-witness identification were more likely to cause the miscarriage of justice, but 
false confessions ranked third.  Id. at 56. 
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false confessions more closely.  In 1998, Leo & Ofshe published a study 
examining sixty cases of police-induced false confessions,223 and in 2004, 
Drizin & Leo expanded on Leo & Ofshe’s study by examining 125 
cases.224  Both studies provided detailed analyses of what happened to the 
suspects after they falsely confessed.225  The Drizin & Leo study further 
reported the age of suspects who falsely confessed226 as well as 
information, when available, about how long the suspects’ interrogation 
lasted before they falsely confessed.227
In fact, in the Inabu Manual, the response to the empirical work on false 
confessions and interrogation techniques
  Although the data usefully 
examines the danger that false confession will lead to conviction as well as 
the special vulnerability of youthful suspects and suspects whose 
interrogations have lasted many hours, it provides little quantitative insight 
into the psychological techniques, such as false evidence ploys, utilized by 
police interrogators. 
228 begins by addressing the 
“anecdotal accounts of presumably false confessions.”229  The Inabu 
Manual cites the Ofshe & Leo study230
Anecdotal reports of false confessions have emotional appeal to the 
uninformed audience.  However, they offer no insight as to the actual 
frequency or cause of false confessions.  As such, they offer no scientific 
basis for drawing any conclusions as to false confessions, other than that 
some suspects historically have falsely confessed.
 and criticizes its failure to prove 
statistical significance or causation: 
231
The authors of the Inabu Manual then respond to Kassin’s laboratory 
experiments, which they deride as being too far removed from real life to 
have any significance: “The fundamental problem with laboratory studies is 
the inability to generalize those findings to the field situation.”
 
232  Finally, 
the Inabu Manual dismisses the importance of Leo’s Inside the 
Interrogation Room233
 
 223. Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 
 by noting that even though the police in that study 
14. 
 224. Drizin & Leo, supra note 3. 
 225. See id. at 949-63; Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 
14, at 472-91. 
 226. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 944-45. 
 227. See id., at 948-49. 
 228. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 441-46. 
 229. Id. at 442 (citing Kassin & McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions, supra 
note 199). 
 230. Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14. 
 231. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 443. 
 232. Id. at 445. 
 233. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 162. 
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employed some coercive techniques, Leo reported no instances of false 
confession.234
Although Drizin & Leo’s 2004 study, which is the most comprehensive 
analysis to date of the impact of false confessions on convictions later 
proven wrongful by DNA testing, does not assess the role of trickery and 
other deceptive law enforcement tactics in producing false confessions, 
other reviews of actual false confession cases have shown that trickery is a 
coercive factor leading the suspect to falsely incriminate himself.  For 
example, Ofshe & Leo have examined the likelihood that various types of 
deceptive interrogation techniques will induce a suspect to falsely 
confess.
 
235  They have concluded that the psychological interrogation 
tactics advocated in police training manuals straightforwardly cause 
suspects to confess to crimes they did not commit.236  In addition, Professor 
Welsh White studied the role of false confessions in capital cases and 
concluded that misrepresenting the presence or strength of forensic 
evidence sometimes produces false confessions.237  Accordingly, he 
recommended that legislatures and courts proscribe police from 
misrepresenting the nature of forensic evidence against capital suspects.238
The empirical studies described in the preceding paragraphs illuminate 
the phenomena that took place in the Central Park Jogger case: the coercive 
effect of deceptive interrogation techniques and the unreliability of the 
confessions they induce.  Moreover, these studies show that Martin 
Tankleff and the young men exonerated of the Central Park Jogger attack 
are assuredly only two case examples of many in which police 
misrepresentation has induced an innocent person to confess.
 
239
 
 234. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 
 
92, at 446. 
 235. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police 
Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. IN L. 
POL. & SOC’Y 189, 202 (1997); see also Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, 
supra note 14, at 440 (citing psychological interrogation methods and poor interrogation 
training as causes of false confessions). 
 236. Id. at 492. 
 237. See White, Confessions in Capital Cases, supra note 158, at 1018. 
 238. Id. at 1018-19. 
 239. See id. at 1016-18 (describing the case of David Vasquez who was wrongfully 
convicted of murder in Virginia after police falsely told him that his fingerprints had been 
found at the crime scene); Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 
221 (describing the case of Michael Crow, who at the age of fourteen falsely confessed to 
murdering his sister after police told him the following untrue “facts”: that his hair was 
found in her fist, that her blood had been found in his bedroom, that the crime was an inside 
job because all doors to the house were found locked, and that Crow had failed a lie detector 
test); Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 462-63 
(describing the case of Gary Gauger who gave a false “hypothetical confession” to killing 
his parents and was later exonerated); see also Coerced Confessions—Why Innocent People 
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IV. PROPOSED REFORMS: CHALLENGING DECEPTIVE INTERROGATION 
TECHNIQUES AS A MEANS OF REDUCING FALSE CONFESSIONS & 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
In this part, I propose that courts and legislatures reconsider the wide 
latitude afforded interrogation techniques based on misrepresentations of 
evidence.  My reasons for this proposal are: first, as discussed in the 
previous section, empirical studies and real-life wrongful conviction cases 
have demonstrated that false evidence ploys are likely to produce false 
confessions; second, as discussed, infra, in a criminal justice system whose 
purported goal is divining the truth, it is bad public policy to permit law 
enforcement officers to try to ascertain the truth by lying to suspects. 
A. Truth-Seeking Function of American Criminal Justice System 
Countless court cases, articles and books have set forth the goals of the 
American criminal justice system, and in particular, our adversarial system 
of justice.  One central tenet of the system is that it is designed not to 
achieve a prosecution at all costs, but rather to unearth the truth about the 
culpability of a defendant.240
 
Admit to Murder, (ABC News television broadcast Mar. 17, 2002) (stating that Gauger 
confessed after police told him that they had independent evidence linking him to the crime 
and that he must have “blacked out” and done it unknowingly); Kassin & Gudjonsson, The 
Psychology of Confessions, supra note 
  If “truth-seeking” is at the heart of our 
adversarial system of justice, then the question arises whether the official 
159, at 56; Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False 
Confessions, supra note 14, at 463-64 (describing the case of Edgar Garrett, who falsely 
confessed to murdering his daughter after police convinced him he did so). 
 240. See William J. Brennan, Jr.,  The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest 
For Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 17 (1990) (citing the “internal function 
of [a criminal trial’s] truth-finding” in arguing for liberal discovery rules in criminal cases); 
see id. at 18 (“Procedural rules ought be designed to maximize the chance that the outcome 
of the trial will be a verdict that is based on what truly occurred.”); Angela J. Davis, 
Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 51-
52 (1998) (describing the prosecutor’s “dual role as an advocate for the government and as 
an administrator of justice”); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) 
(recognizing the “special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in 
criminal trials); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1980); Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse 
of Scientific Evidence By Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 17, 18 (2003) (“If a 
prosecutor uses the evidence responsibly, the verdict is trusted and the public’s confidence 
in the adjudicative process is enhanced.”); Gershman, supra, at 19 (“The prosecutor’s role 
as a ‘minister of justice’ includes preeminently a duty to seek the truth.”); Dan Conley in 
Profile, 39 THE PROSECUTOR 16, available at http://www.ndaa-
apri.org/ndaa/profile/dan_conley_jan_feb_2005.html (quoting Boston district attorney Dan 
Conley as saying, “Our job (as prosecutors) is not simply to make arrests and preserve 
convictions at all costs.  Our job is to seek the truth and achieve justice . . . There is nothing 
more critical to the integrity of the criminal justice system than to look at the evidence, no 
matter when it comes, and follow the facts and the law.”). 
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use of deception and falsehood should play any role in developing the 
prosecution’s case.241
First, as recognized in Cayward and Patton, courts’ acceptance and thus 
sanction of the use of trickery during interrogations creates a risk that 
trickery will bleed into other parts of criminal prosecutions.  This is a 
significant risk even despite deeply rooted and recently affirmed precedent 
requiring honesty and fair-dealing in criminal prosecutions.
 
242  The 
Cayward case may represent the outer fringe of the use of false evidence in 
interrogations, but the principles enunciated therein are by no means 
limited to cases in which forged documents are presented to the suspect.  
The Florida appeals court which decided Cayward cited at least three major 
concerns which prompted it to draw the line of police trickery at the 
fabrication of documents: 1) that the manufacturing of documents offends 
“our traditional notions of due process;”243 2) that false reports might be 
preserved indefinitely and may inadvertently be introduced into the court 
record;244 and 3) that approval of the concoction of evidence reports would 
create a slippery slope which might lead to the fabrication of other official 
documents such as warrants, orders, lab reports, and judgments.245
None of these concerns are limited to the forgery of documents.  In fact 
there is no principled distinction between a fake document and an officer’s 
oral report to a suspect that he has failed a polygraph examination, which is 
a commonly used technique for eliciting confessions.
 
246
 
 241. Even some of Miranda’s harshest critics base their criticism on the decision’s 
purported thwarting of the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system by 
protecting the guilty from the consequences of their truthful confessions.  See, e.g., Paul G. 
Cassell, A Tribute to Joe Grano: He Kept the Flame Alive, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1215, 1216 
(2000); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 707 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting 
in part). 
  Both sorts of 
official misrepresentation offend traditional notions of due process.  
Forgery and oral misrepresentation differ from one another only in degree 
rather that in kind.  False reports may be preserved indefinitely and 
 242. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 701-03, 705 (2004); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 432-38, 441 (1995) (discussing prosecutorial misconduct); Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963) (requiring prosecutors to turn over to the defense any exculpatory 
information in its possession); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-72 (1959) (prohibiting 
prosecutors from knowingly using perjured evidence). 
 243. State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 975. 
 246. Kassin & Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 159, at 
57 (“It is important to note that as a historical matter, the polygraph has played a key role in 
the interrogation tactic of presenting false evidence.  The polygraph is best known for its use 
as a lie-detector test, but because polygraph evidence is not admissible in most courts, police 
use it primarily to induce suspects to confess.”). 
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introduced into the court record, presenting a risk when a law enforcement 
officer tells a suspect, for example, that he has failed a polygraph and that 
representation is recorded on tape or transcribed and later presented in the 
case record.  There may be no documentation of the fact that the suspect 
did not in fact fail the polygraph, but there may very well remain 
documentation of the officer’s report that he did fail.247
Thus, the same risk of an official lie becoming a part of the court record 
results from an oral misrepresentation as from a forged document.  In fact, 
a counterargument to the court’s analysis in Cayward is that it may be 
easier to discern whether a tangible item such as a document is forged than 
it is to determine in the absence of some documentation whether an oral 
representation was simply a misunderstanding, deliberately misleading, or 
an outright lie.  Finally, there is no reason to believe that drawing the line at 
a forged evidence report will be a bulwark against the forgery of other 
official documents.
 
248  If our courts tolerate, and sanction as constitutional, 
law enforcement trickery as long as it is not reduced to paper, then 
applying the same logic as the Cayward court applied, there is nothing 
stopping police from fabricating information about any number of official 
transactions and events.  Moreover, there is no clear basis for 
distinguishing deception by police when interrogating suspects, from 
deception by prosecutors when presenting evidence in court, a practice 
which courts have long held to offend the Constitution.249  Again, there is 
little justification for drawing the line at false documents which have been 
proven no more damaging to criminal cases and to confidence in our 
criminal justice system than other forms of deception employed routinely 
by those who are sworn to protect and uphold the law.250
 
 247. See also State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783, 794, 798-99 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2003) (discussing 
the risks in using fabricated audio-taped evidence during interrogation which, in this case, 
included the prosecution’s use of the fabricated evidence at trial to satisfy its burden that the 
confession was voluntary and which prejudiced the jury by exposing it to otherwise 
inadmissible prior bad act hearsay evidence). 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.  Relatedly, interrogating officers should 
apprise prosecutors when they employ false evidence ploys and other deceptive 
interrogation techniques to elicit incriminating statements.  Prosecutors should be aware of 
the circumstances begetting confession evidence before deciding whether to rely on such 
evidence in pursuing prosecutions. 
 250. See, e.g., Aaron M. Clemens, Removing the Market for Lying Snitches: Reforms to 
Prevent Unjust Convictions, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 151, 190-191 (2004) (criticizing law 
enforcement’s use of imaginary informants in drug cases and discussing other legally 
sanctioned forms of police trickery). 
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B. Recommendations 
In light of the scientific findings and actual wrongful conviction cases 
demonstrating that false evidence ploys and other forms of law 
enforcement trickery produce false confessions,251 and in light of the fact 
that allowing police to lie to suspects undermines our justice system’s 
reliance on truth to discover the truth, courts and lawmakers should outlaw 
the deliberate deception of suspects by police.252
First, legislators should pass statutes outlawing law enforcement 
misrepresentations about incriminating evidence during interrogations and 
limiting the use of trickery during custodial questioning generally.
  The following are a few 
recommendations toward this end. 
253
In light of the ample evidence that false law enforcement claims about 
the availability and nature of incriminating evidence induce false 
  At a 
minimum, these laws should prohibit police from misrepresenting the 
presence or strength of forensic evidence against a suspect.  They should 
also outlaw police misrepresentations about statements of alleged 
accomplices or eyewitnesses incriminating the suspect.  In addition, these 
statutes should circumscribe police from outrightly misleading a suspect 
about the purposes of the interrogation; for example, indicating that he is a 
witness instead of a suspect. Statutes should also require police to alert 
prosecutors to their use of deceptive interrogation techniques in any given 
case.  This requirement will give prosecutors an opportunity to evaluate the 
incriminating evidence in a complete light.  Prosecutors should, in turn, be 
required to provide notice to defense counsel that police misled the 
defendant about critical evidence before he confessed.  Defense counsel 
ought to then challenge the admissibility of the confession as recommended 
more fully below. 
 
 251. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 491-92 
This article has documented that American police continue to elicit false 
confessions even though the era of third degree interrogation has passed . . . For 
those concerned with the proper administration of justice, the important issue is no 
longer whether contemporary interrogation methods cause innocent suspects to 
confess.  Nor is it to speculate about the rate of police-induced false confession or 
the annual number of wrongful convictions they cause.  Rather, the important 
question is: How can such errors be prevented? 
 252. See id. at  493 (“False confessions threaten the quality of criminal justice in America 
by inflicting significant and unnecessary harms on the innocent.”). 
 253. See White, Confessions in Capital Cases, supra note 158, at 982-83, 992-93 
(relating several reforms of interrogation techniques that the Governor’s Commission on 
Capital Punishment recommended, including heightened judicial scrutiny of interrogation 
tactics that mislead the suspect as to the strength of the evidence against him or the 
likelihood of his guilt “in order to determine whether this tactic would be likely to induce an 
involuntary or untrustworthy confession”). 
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confessions and consequently wrongful convictions, legislators need not 
wait until a high-profile exoneration takes place in their state.254
Recognizing, however, that events in particular cases often spur criminal 
justice reform, the following recommendations are aimed at defense 
counsel representing clients in cases in which confession evidence plays a 
central role.  These recommendations are particularly important in cases 
where there is little, or weak, independent evidence corroborating the 
confession. The recommendations are aimed at exposing both false 
confessions and the factors that induce people to incriminate themselves in 
crimes they did not commit.  As more examples of false confessions 
induced by false evidence ploys and other deceptive interrogation tactics 
come to light, legislators and their constituents will likely be more willing 
to advocate for reform circumscribing such techniques.
  Rather, 
every state should establish Innocence Commissions to examine the 
prevalence of factors known to lead to wrongful convictions—including 
false confessions—nationwide, and to establish reforms aimed at 
preventing conviction of the innocent. 
255
Defense lawyers ought to routinely ask their clients who make custodial 
incriminating statements whether police made any representations that 
evidence linked them to the crime.  If it turns out that police did make such 
representations and that the purported evidence did not exist, defense 
counsel should argue that the confession is per se inadmissible.
 
256
As early as practically possible after a suspect has been arrested, defense 
counsel should seek discovery of any independent evidence corroborating 
her client’s statements to police.  Defense counsel should then 
independently assess whether the physical evidence, other witness 
statements, or any other reliable piece of information establishes the 
  Even if 
trial courts are constrained by the precedent holding that trickery in 
interrogation is constitutional, the issue will be preserved for presentation 
on direct appeal and post-conviction where state and federal courts may 
reconsider the parameters of what kind of law enforcement deception 
warrants per se suppression of confessions and what deceptive techniques 
are constitutionally permissible. 
 
 254. Of the 154 DNA exonerations, at least thirty-six have involved false confessions.  E-
mail from Huy Dao, Case Director, The Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo School 
of Law (Jan. 12, 2005) (on file with author). 
 255. In order to respond effectively to anticipated protests by police groups that false 
evidence ploys and other deceptive tactics are necessary to catch the guilty and that they 
rarely ensnare the innocent, advocates for reform will have to carefully develop case-related 
examples of false confessions wrought by the tactics they seek to circumscribe.  These 
recommendations are aimed at developing such examples. 
 256. See State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783, 802-03 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
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veracity of any part of the client’s incriminating statement.257
In cases in which the confession is the only evidence against the 
defendant, and there is no independent physical or other reliable evidence 
of guilt, defense counsel should move for dismissal of the case altogether.  
Given the revelations brought to light by DNA and other exonerations that 
confession evidence is often unreliable and the basis for wrongful 
convictions,
  When in 
doubt, counsel should employ the services of a psychologist or other false 
confession expert who possesses the skills to objectively evaluate the 
reliability of the confession.  At the same time, counsel should move for 
discovery of interrogation manuals and practices employed by the 
prosecuting law enforcement agency.  Counsel should determine whether 
these include instructions on using false evidence ploys to induce a 
confession and then move to allow expert testimony at trial about the extent 
to which such interrogation methods undermine the reliability of 
confessions.  The production of such manuals will both assist counsel and 
the retained confession expert in assessing what techniques were used in 
the defendant’s interrogation, and provide a basis for suppression hearings, 
jury instructions, and other proceedings related to the reliability of the 
confession. 
258 no criminal prosecution should proceed on the basis of the 
defendant’s uncorroborated self-incriminating statement alone.259
In cases in which a confession is the principal evidence against the 
defendant and there is some credible indication that deceptive interrogation 
tactics were used, defense counsel should also move for full suppression 
hearings to cross-examine officers about the deceptive interrogation tactics 
employed.  During such hearings, the defendant and other witnesses make a 
record of the falsehoods police told the suspect before he confessed, and 
experts testify about the coercive effects of the deceptive interrogation 
 
 
 257. Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 495 
(discussing the need . . .[t]o carefully scrutinize and evaluate a suspect’s post-admission 
narrative against the known facts of the crime” and warning that, “In investigations in which 
hard evidence linking a person to a crime is missing, only the analysis of the suspect’s post-
admission narrative provides a basis for objectively assessing his personal knowledge of a 
crime.”). 
 258. See supra note 254 and accompanying text (citing Innocence Project statistics on 
false confessions). 
 259. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 495 (“It 
bears emphasizing that in none of the disputed confessions documented in this article was 
there any reliable evidence corroborating the defendant’s confession . . . absent the 
uncorroborated and unreliable statement, none of these individuals would likely have been 
arrested, charged, convicted, incarcerated, or executed.”).  The Inbau Manual acknowledges 
that confessions lacking independent corroborating evidence “should be viewed 
suspiciously.”  INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 437. 
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techniques on the suspect.260  Trial courts should in turn insist on some 
independent evidence before admitting a confession into evidence.261
In addition, counsel should move for jury instructions apprising the jury 
that they may consider the circumstances of the confession, including 
whether the defendant was misled about the nature or strength of evidence 
linking him to the crime and accord the incriminating statements less 
weight if they find that they were influenced by law enforcement 
falsehoods.  Such instructions will encourage the jury to place the 
confession into its proper context and give it the appropriate weight, 
particularly if there is little or no other evidence linking the defendant to 
the crime.  As with the suppression motion, moving for the instruction 
preserves the issue for appellate and post-conviction review even if the 
motion is denied. 
 
Attorneys should challenge the validity of confessions begotten by 
trickery on appeal as well as in post-conviction proceedings.  As reviewing 
courts learn more about the impact of the practice and the ways in which it 
undermines the reliability of and confidence in the evidence used to 
convict, it may encourage judges to circumscribe the use of deceptive 
techniques.  Courts hearing such challenges should establish bright-line 
exclusionary rules prohibiting the use of false evidence during 
interrogations. Such rules would automatically render inadmissible 
statements derived from intentionally false representations by law 
enforcement about such matters as the presence or strength of forensic 
evidence, incriminating statements by eyewitnesses or alleged accomplices, 
and whether the defendant was led to believe that he was being questioned 
merely as a witness rather than as a suspect.262
Civil remedies should also be pursued when exonerations come to light 
in cases involving deceptive interrogation practices that resulted in false 
 
 
 260. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66-67 (2004) (discussing the 
circumstances of the witness’s interrogation, which included “leading questions” by police 
officers and noting that it was “imperative” that she be cross examined in order to allow the 
jury to assess her statements’ truth). 
 261. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 495 
(recommending that “courts insist on minimal indicia of reliability before admitting 
confession statements into evidence”). 
 262. See State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783, 804 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2003).  But see Godsey, supra 
note 31, at 536-37 (arguing that psychological interrogation techniques are “intangible” 
violations and should not be considered “objective penalties” warranting the suppression of 
a confession); id. at 537 (“Extending the category of penalties to include changes in mood or 
feelings caused by psychological pressure would create the same type of ambiguity and 
subjectivity that haunts the due process involuntary confession rule. Psychological pressures 
should, therefore, not be considered penalties. Pressures of this type are better suited for 
regulation under the due process clauses.”). 
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confessions.  The Fourth Circuit has recently affirmed, in a Section 1983 
case, a Virginia district court’s denial of qualified immunity to a police 
officer who is alleged to have fabricated evidence which purportedly 
showed that a rape and murder suspect provided police with independent 
evidence of the crime unknown to the public.263  The plaintiff alleged that 
the officer and his colleague fed him, a mentally impaired man, relevant 
facts and then transcribed his answers to create his “confession.”264  The 
Fourth Circuit held that the district court fairly concluded that the 
plaintiff—the exonerated man—had alleged facts amounting to a 
deprivation of a constitutional right which was clearly established at the 
time of the plaintiff’s conviction, namely the right not to be convicted 
pursuant to a fabricated police report of his confession.265
Legislators should also pass laws circumscribing criminal prosecutions 
in at least the most serious of cases, rape and murder, where there is no 
independent, reliable evidence other than the suspect’s own incriminating 
statements.
  The 
interrogation tactics in the Fourth Circuit case were not so much trickery of 
the suspect as much as they were misrepresentation of the circumstances of 
the confession, but the case opens the door for other exonerated people to 
sue when their convictions have been based on police chicanery during 
interrogations.  If officers are deprived of immunity when their standard 
interrogation techniques deprive the innocent of liberty, then police 
departments may become more motivated to reevaluate interrogation 
tactics that most often result in false confessions. 
266 (As noted above, police should be required to disclose to 
prosecutors cases in which deceptive interrogation tactics result in 
confessions.)  This proposal is not unlike the Illinois Commission’s 
recommendation that prosecutions based solely on the uncorroborated 
testimony of a single eyewitness, accomplice, or jailhouse snitch, be 
ineligible for capital punishment.267
Videotaping interrogations is another widely recommended reform 
which, if performed correctly, not only protects the right of the accused by 
 
 
 263. See Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 281-83 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 264. See id. at 277. 
 265. See id. at 283. 
 266. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 495  
(recommending that “police are trained to seek both independent evidence of a suspect’s 
guilt and internal corroboration for every confession before making an arrest,” and that 
“state’s attorneys demand that ‘I did it’ statements be corroborated by the details of a 
suspect’s post-admission narrative before undertaking a prosecution”). 
 267. See FORMER ILL. GOVERNOR RYAN’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT, 
RECOMMENDATION 158 (2002), available at 
http://idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/index.html’. 
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providing an objective account of the interrogation, but also insulates 
police from frivolous claims that a confession has been coerced.268  In 
Illinois, the videotaping of interrogations is being phased into practice 
pursuant to legislation recommended by Governor George Ryan’s 
commission recommending reforms designed to reduce the likelihood of 
wrongful conviction.269  Videotaping is also required in a number of other 
jurisdictions.270  Lawmakers in other states should also adopt the practice, 
especially in homicide cases.271
In short, it is high time to do away with the long tradition of the use of 
deception to trick suspects into confessing.  The demonstrated correlation 
between police deception during interrogation and false confessions 
leading to wrongful convictions should inspire timely judicial and 
legislative reform. 
 
CONCLUSION 
At the core of the American justice system is the reliance on actual, 
 
 268. See Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 225. 
 269. See Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Will Taping Interrogations Fix the System? Law 
Requires Police to Record Questioning, and Some Hope it Prevents False Confession, THE 
CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2005 at A1 (reporting that as of July 2005, state law will require police 
across Illinois to videotape interrogations in all homicide investigations; under the new law 
a confession will be presumed inadmissible as evidence if the police interrogation leading 
up to it is not videotaped, with exceptions available if the suspect chooses not to be 
videotaped or if video equipment is unavailable).  For a detailed report on law enforcement 
experiences with videotaping interrogations, see, for example,  Thomas P. Sullivan, POLICE 
EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS, A SPECIAL REPORT 
PRESENTED BY THE NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW’S CENTER ON WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS (2004) (reporting on the experiences of 238 law enforcement agencies in 
thirty-eight states which videotape interrogations and concluding, “Recordings benefit 
suspects, law enforcement, prosecutors, juries, trial and reviewing court judges, and the 
search for truth in our justice system.  The time has come for standard police practice 
throughout the United States to include the use of devices to record the entire interrogation 
of suspects in custody in all major felony investigations.”).  Recently, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that police must electronically record all interrogations of juvenile 
suspects.  See In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 120-21 (Wis. 2005).  The case which 
prompted the reform involved a fourteen-year-old boy accused of armed robbery.  Id.  at 
113.  Police handcuffed him to a wall and left him alone for two hours before questioning 
him without counsel for five hours. Id. at 113, 114.  Eventually, he confessed to 
participating in the robbery.  Id. at 114. 
 270. See Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 225 (noting 
that Minnesota, Alaska, Illinois, and Maine have mandatory videotaping requirements, 
recommending that videotaping be adopted widely, and describing the protocols most likely 
to produce a neutral view of the interrogation); see also Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of 
False Confessions, supra note 14, at 494. 
 271. See White, Confessions in Capital Cases, supra note 158, at 990 (citing Samuel R. 
Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 
BUFF. L. REV. 469, 485 (1996)). 
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legally obtained evidence to discern the truth about a crime and to convict 
the guilty.  In principle, the law is designed to increase confidence in the 
administration of justice and to insure that the guilty are convicted with 
legally obtained evidence and the innocent go free. 
In the era preceding the advent of DNA exonerations and other 
conclusive proof of wrongful convictions, it was generally accepted by 
police and by courts that standard police interrogation practices, including 
the routine deception of suspects about significant matters related to their 
interrogation, did not induce false confessions.  On the basis of this 
presumption, courts have consistently held that police may use lies, 
trickery, and various forms of deception when interrogating suspects. 
In recent years, however, ever-increasing numbers of wrongful 
convictions have exposed the practical fallout of such deceptive 
interrogation practices.  Wrongful convictions have provided an 
opportunity to closely examine the factors which cause the innocent to 
confess to serious crimes.  As the case studies and empirical data outlined 
in this article demonstrate, interrogators’ deception of suspects concerning 
critical issues such as the purpose of the interrogation and the strength or 
availability of incriminating physical or testimonial evidence, often leads 
the innocent to miscalculate the risks or costs of admitting involvement in a 
crime.  These studies effectively counter the leading interrogation manual’s 
insistence that standard interrogation techniques never cause the innocent 
to confess. 
In light of the growing catalogue of cases involving demonstrably false 
confessions as well as empirical data correlating deceptive interrogation 
techniques with false confessions, courts and lawmakers should seize the 
opportunity to reevaluate their acceptance of deliberate law enforcement 
misrepresentation and to realign interrogation practices with the justice 
system’s principled reliance on truth.  Minimal safeguards include: per se 
exclusion of confessions made after police have misrepresented the 
availability or strength of physical or testimonial evidence; the 
establishment of innocence commissions to examine the factors, including 
deceptive interrogation techniques, contributing to false confessions; the 
enactment of laws proscribing police from misrepresenting during 
interrogations the nature or availability of evidence against suspects; and 
the enactment of laws requiring police to disclose to prosecutors, and 
prosecutors to disclose to defense counsel, instances in which a suspect 
confessed only after the police employed deceptive interrogation tactics.  In 
addition, prosecutors should be prohibited from prosecuting cases in which 
the only incriminating evidence is a confession following police 
misrepresentation of evidence or misleading about the purpose of the 
interrogation.  Finally, defense attorneys have an obligation to challenge 
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the admissibility of confessions wrought by deceptive interrogation tactics, 
and to provide data before trial, at trial, and on appeal of the coercive 
effects of deceptive police interrogation practices. 
The notion that protection of the innocent is paramount to a credible 
criminal justice system is universally recognized.  The recommendations 
herein—reforms designed to limit the use of deceptive interrogation 
techniques and challenges to confessions elicited via such techniques—will 
go a long way toward protecting the innocent, reducing the risks of false 
confessions, and shoring up the reliability of our justice system. 
 
